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Police Arbitration
Stephen Rushin*
Before punishing an officer for professional misconduct, police
departments often provide the officer with an opportunity to file an appeal. In
many police departments, this appeals process culminates in a hearing before
an arbitrator. While numerous media reports have suggested that arbitrators
regularly overturn or reduce discipline, little legal research has
comprehensively examined the outcomes of police disciplinary appeals across
the United States.
In order to better understand the use of arbitration in police
disciplinary appeals and build on prior research, this Article draws on a
dataset of 624 arbitration awards issued between 2006 and 2020 from a diverse
range of law enforcement agencies. It finds that arbitrators on appeal reduced
or overturned police officer discipline in 52% of these cases. In 46% of cases
involving termination, arbitrators ordered police departments to rehire
previously terminated officers. On average, arbitrators reduced the length of
officer suspensions by approximately 49%.
Arbitrators gave several common justifications for reductions in officer
discipline. Frequently, arbitrators found the original discipline to be excessive
relative to the offense committed or relative to punishments received by other
officers. In a somewhat smaller number of cases, arbitrators cited insufficient
evidence or procedural flaws in the investigation or adjudication of the original
internal disciplinary process.
This Article concludes by considering the implications of these findings
for the literature on police accountability. It also considers emerging efforts in
states like Minnesota and Oregon to reform police arbitration procedures in
order to better balance officers’ interests in due process with the public’s interest
in accountability.

*
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, Seattle Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole fired
Officer Adley Shepherd for punching a handcuffed woman named
Miyekko Durden-Bosley in the face, fracturing her orbital socket.1 The
facts leading up to the assault were mostly not in dispute. Over two
years earlier, Shepherd and two other Seattle Police Department
(“SPD”) officers responded to a domestic violence call in a residential
neighborhood in South Seattle.2 Video recordings of the incident showed
Officer Shepherd became irritated as he and his fellow officers
attempted to resolve a tense dispute between three individuals.3
1.
Steve Miletich, Officer Fired for Punching Drunk, Handcuffed Woman, SEATTLE TIMES,
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-police-officer-fired-over-punching-ofhandcuffed-woman (last updated Nov. 9, 2016, 10:13 PM) [https://perma.cc/T3ZN-6M8V]
(providing a link to a video of the incident and a full description of the events surrounding Officer
Shepherd’s actions).
2.
Steve Miletich, Video Shows SPD Officer Punch Cuffed Woman, Documents Say, SEATTLE
TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/video-shows-spd-officer-punch-cuffed-womandocuments-say (last updated Jan. 13, 2016, 11:22 AM) [https://perma.cc/6XS2-4EBR] (describing
how Durden-Bosley appeared intoxicated in the video and repeatedly denied making any threats
before her arrest).
3.
SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, OPA 14-0216, DISCIPLINARY ACTION REPORT: OFFICER ADLEY
SHEPHERD
(2016),
http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2016/11/DAR_
11.9.16.pdf [perma.cc/N5EB-W2F5] [hereinafter SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT] (providing the
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Eventually, Officer Shepherd declared that his “patience was done” and
that “someone was going to jail.”4 He then handcuffed Durden-Bosley
and placed her under arrest for allegedly making threats.5 On the video,
Durden-Bosley repeatedly shouted that she “did not make a threat.”6
The video then shows Officer Shepherd force Durden-Bosley into the
back of his squad car.7 Clearly upset, Durden-Bosley responded by
kicking towards the officer, possibly striking Officer Shepherd in his
jaw.8 Officer Shepherd briefly stepped back from the car to regain his
balance and told his fellow officers, “she kicked me.”9 Seconds later,
Officer Shepherd lunged into the backseat and punched Durden-Bosley
in her right eye.10 Throughout the incident, Durden-Bosley’s hands
were handcuffed behind her back.11
While Officer Shepherd came away from the confrontation with
relatively minimal injuries,12 Durden-Bosley suffered a bloody, bruised,
and swollen right eye as a result of an orbital fracture. 13 Almost
immediately after the incident, the SPD’s Office of Professional
Accountability opened an internal investigation into Officer Shepherd’s

summary of factual findings made by the Officer of Police Accountability and signed by the Seattle
police chief).
4.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5.
Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award at 11, Seattle Police Officers Guild v.
City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR (Dec. 7, 2018), ECF No. 512-6.
6.
Miletech, supra note 1 (linking video of incident).
7.
Id. (showing a struggle between Officer Shepherd and Durden-Bosley that appears to
result in Officer Shepherd shoving her into the squad car where she lands on her back with her
legs hanging outside of the squad car, pointed in the direction of Officer Shepherd).
8.
Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 4, 19. It is not
immediately clear from the video whether the kicks hit the officer or where they may have made
contact. Officer Shepherd also audibly exclaims that she kicked him before he punches her. Later
in the evening, when Officer Shepherd reportedly sought medical attention, he claimed that
Durden-Bosley’s Doc Marten shoe hit him in the jaw, causing him “shooting pain” for several
seconds thereafter. See id. at 4, 6. In reviewing the events of that evening, the arbitrator on appeal
described Durden-Bosley as engaging in a “felonious assault on an officer,” for which she was not
charged. Id. at 6.
9.
Id. at 4, 19.
10. Id.
11. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (placing particular emphasis on the fact
that the suspect was handcuffed during his assault).
12. Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that Officer
Shepherd was “diagnosed with moderate, acute Temporomandibular Disorder (TMD)” due to the
trauma from the kick, but noting that he only took one sick day before returning to the force).
13. Lewis Kamb, Judge Reverses Arbitrator’s Rule Reinstating Seattle Police Officer Who
Punched Handcuffed Suspect, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/judgereverses-arbitrators-rule-reinstating-seattle-police-officer-who-punched-handcuffed-suspect (last
updated Aug. 17, 2019, 12:15 PM) [https://perma.cc/BMK2-HZKQ] (showing multiple graphic
photographs of Durden-Bosley’s injuries from the confrontation and also describing how, in a very
rare set of events, a judge ultimately overturned the decision of the arbitrator in this case based
on a determination that it was contrary to public policy).
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behavior.14 Durden-Bosley also filed a § 1983 suit alleging a deprivation
of her civil rights,15 which Seattle settled for $195,000 in 2016.16 Two
years later, after a lengthy internal investigation, Chief O’Toole
concluded that Officer Shepherd violated the department’s use of force
policy.17 As she explained in her disciplinary report, the department’s
use of force policy requires officers to utilize de-escalation tactics and
employ only necessary and proportional force.18 Officer Shepherd’s
conduct violated these principles, as there was no justification for him
to assault an unarmed, “small, handcuffed, and supine” woman whom
he had already secured in the back of his squad car.19 And, according to
Chief O’Toole, there were numerous ways that Officer Shepherd
could have easily taken control of the situation without resorting to a
violent assault.20
Further, Chief O’Toole noted that this was not the first time that
Officer Shepherd’s violation of departmental policies had seriously
harmed a civilian. In 2009, the SPD suspended Officer Shepherd for ten
days for prematurely releasing a domestic violence suspect who
returned home and murdered his roommate.21 When viewed together,
14. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (describing the Office of Professional
Accountability investigation of Officer Shepherd).
15. See Sara Jean Green, Woman Punched by SPD Cop While Handcuffed Files Lawsuit,
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/woman-punched-by-spd-copwhile-handcuffed-files-lawsuit/ (last updated Apr. 24, 2015, 9:11 AM) [https://perma.cc/4UVMAHN9] (explaining that the suit accused “the Seattle Police Department of negligent training and
supervision of Shepherd and cites three violations of Durden-Bosley’s civil rights for excessive
force, unreasonable search and seizure, and failure to train the officer,” and claimed further that
Durden-Bosley experienced “severe pain, partial blindness, a concussion, nausea and vomiting”
because of the assault).
16. Christine Clarridge, Woman Punched by Seattle Cop Settles Civil Suit for $195,000,
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/woman-punched-by-seattleofficer-settles-suit-for-195000 (last updated June 21, 2016, 6:39 PM) [https://perma.cc/Q7UNM3QE] (discussing the controversy surrounding Officer Shepherd’s use of force against DurdenBosley and the subsequent settlement).
17. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3.
18. Id. (clarifying that under SPD policy, force may only be used against handcuffed suspects
under “exceptional circumstances” like immediate risk of injury, escape, or destruction of property,
none of which existed here).
19. Id.
20. Id. (explaining that he could have stepped away to de-escalate, utilized the other two
officers on the scene, attempted to simply close the door of the car, or simply paused momentarily
to reassess the situation).
21. Id.:
This instance marks . . . the second time you have failed to take personal
responsibility . . . . You previously received a ten day suspension in 2009 for violating a
different SPD policy where your failure resulted in the death of a victim; as such, you
should be acutely aware of the potentially dire consequences of disregarding policies
created to protect the public;
Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 25–26 (describing the prior
incident in detail).
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Chief O’Toole concluded that this series of behaviors exhibited a pattern
of poor judgment.22 Based on these findings, Chief O’Toole terminated
Officer Shepherd’s employment with the SPD.23 But before Chief
O’Toole could finalize the firing, Officer Shepherd had the legal right
under his collective bargaining agreement to file an appeal before
an arbitrator to determine whether “just cause” existed for
his termination.24
As is often the case in police disciplinary matters,25 Seattle’s
police union contract empowers an arbitrator, as part of a panel, to lead
an independent hearing to review factual and legal determinations
made by the police chief.26 In November 2018—over four years after the
incident in question—an arbitrator overturned the firing.27 While the
arbitrator agreed that Officer Shepherd violated the department’s use
of force policy in unjustifiably assaulting Durden-Bosley, she concluded
that termination was simply “too severe a penalty.”28 Instead, the
arbitrator reduced Officer Shepherd’s punishment to a fifteen-day
suspension and ordered the SPD to rehire Shepherd with back pay.29
22. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (“I cannot take the risk of affording you
further opportunity to serve as a police officer for this City given your demonstrated lapses in
judgment and restraint.”).
23. Id. (“I have determined that your employment with the Department should
be terminated.”).
24. CITY OF SEATTLE, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SEATTLE AND SEATTLE
POLICE OFFICERS’ GUILD 7–8 (2013), https://www.seattle.gov/personnel/resources/pubs/SPOG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PS7-BY3K]. It is worth noting that this was the then-effective collective
bargaining agreement between Seattle and the Police Guild. They have since agreed to a different
union contract that somewhat amends the appeals procedure in the city.
25. See Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (2019) (providing
a comprehensive empirical analysis of the disciplinary procedures in 656 police departments and
finding that many of the features described in this introduction mirror those used by a majority of
police departments in that sample).
26. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 24, at 7 (describing the “just cause” standard for
disciplinary appeals).
27. In Seattle, police disciplinary appeals are handled by a Disciplinary Review Board
consisting of one representative appointed by the police union, one representative appointed by
the city (often a high-ranking supervisor like the assistant chief), and one labor arbitrator selected
“from a pool of arbitrators agreed upon by the parties within 30 days after execution of the
agreement.” Id. at 8. Functionally, this means that when a grievance is filed by the police union
on behalf of an officer, arguing that the city has punished an officer without just cause, the decision
of the appointed labor arbitrator will likely bind the city. For all practical purposes, this model of
litigating police disciplinary appeals is similar to those used by many American cities, in that the
labor arbitrator has the final say in these disciplinary grievances. Disciplinary Review Board’s
Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 31 (“Although his was a serious offense, the Board majority
finds that discharge was too severe a penalty, considering the circumstances of his use of force and
other mitigating considerations.”).
28. Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 31.
29. Id.:
The Board majority hereby orders instead that Officer Shepherd be disciplined for
violating City’s policy on the use of force with a 15-day unpaid suspension. It is also
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Police reform advocates and city leaders in Seattle were
disappointed and frustrated by the arbitrator’s decision.30 Although
some might find the events in Seattle troubling, they do not appear
unique. All across the country, reporters have documented numerous
similar cases where arbitrators on appeal have ordered police
departments to rehire officers deemed unfit for duty by their
supervisors.31 These include: an officer in Sarasota, Florida, caught on
camera allegedly beating a suspect in custody without justification; 32 an
officer in San Antonio, Texas, who repeatedly used an offensive racial
slur while arresting a Black man;33 a Broward County, Florida, sheriff’s
deputy who allegedly hid during the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School shooting;34 and a Washington, D.C., officer who allegedly
sexually abused a teenager in his squad car.35
Officers argue that these appellate hearings provide an
important due process protection by allowing a neutral third party to
reevaluate internal disciplinary actions.36 According to this viewpoint,

ordered that he be reinstated as a police officer and that he receive[ ] full back
pay . . . less 15 days for the suspension, and less all interim earnings and compensation.
30. Lewis Kamb, Arbitrator Reinstates Seattle Police Officer Fired in 2016 for Punching
Intoxicated Handcuffed Woman, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/arbitrator-reinstates-seattle-police-officer-fired-in-2016-for-punching-intoxicatedhandcuffed-woman/ (last updated Nov. 20, 2018, 3:30 PM) [https://perma.cc/R6P9-4LET] (quoting
the spokesman for the city attorney saying that they were “disappointed” and “strongly disagree
with” the decision; also noting that the NAACP in Seattle wanted Officer Shepherd criminally
prosecuted for his behavior and likened “the case to the deaths of two black men, Eric Garner in
New York and Michael Brown in Missouri”).
31. For a comprehensive series of stories about officers rehired on appeal, see Kimbriell Kelly,
Wesley Lowery & Steven Rich, Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers Fired
for Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/ [https://perma.cc/VJZ8-JH3Z]. For other
examples not listed below, see Everton Bailey Jr., Portland Must Rehire Cop Fired After Killing
Unarmed Man in 2010, Court Rules, OREGONIAN, https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/
index.ssf/2015/12/portland_must_rehire_cop_fired.html
(last
updated
Jan.
9,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/MH46-6DD4] (explaining that an appellate court upheld an arbitrator’s
decision); Connecticut Town Rehires Officer Who Shot Unarmed Man, NEW HAVEN REG.,
https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Connecticut-town-rehires-officer-who-shotunarmed-11367888.php (last updated July 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GST3-2ZHB].
32. Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Street,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unionskeep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/ [https://perma.cc/WD8W-YE4T].
33. Mary Claire Patton & Tim Gerber, San Antonio Officer Fired for Using N-Word Gets Job
Back, KSAT NEWS, https://www.ksat.com/news/2019/11/05/san-antonio-officer-fired-for-using-nword-gets-job-back/ (last updated Jan. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UYT4-JETC].
34. Devoun Cetoute & Carli Teproff, Fired Parkland BSO Deputy Given Job Back With Full
Back Pay, Union Says, MIAMI HERALD (May 13, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/community/broward/article242719216.html [https://perma.cc/LJZ6-RLX4].
35. Kelly et al., supra note 31.
36. Id. (explaining that “[p]olice unions argue that the right to appeal terminations through
arbitration protects officers from arbitrary punishment or being second-guessed for their split-
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these types of appellate procedures protect officers from unfair
punishment and force police departments to maintain high standards
in the investigation and adjudication of alleged misconduct. But some
police reform advocates and police chiefs criticize the use of arbitration
in appeals of police discipline as an antidemocratic usurpation of a
community’s ability to control its police force.37 Critics also argue that
the procedural choices made by some police departments in employing
these appeals may systematically incentivize unreasonably high rates
of reversals or reductions in discipline on appeal.38 If true, this critique
of police arbitration has significant implications for the literature on
police accountability. A relatively small body of legal research, however,
has considered the outcomes of appellate arbitrations in police
disciplinary cases.
This Article contributes to the existing literature and builds on
prior research39 by conducting an examination of police arbitration
across a national dataset of 624 police disciplinary appeals litigated
before over two hundred arbitrators between 2006 and 2020 from a
diverse range of law enforcement agencies.40 This dataset covers police
appellate arbitration decisions in twenty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico.41 It includes disciplinary appeals for police
departments and sheriff’s departments of all sizes, as well as a number
of specialized law enforcement agencies.42 Of these 624 opinions, 333
involved appeals of officer terminations.43 In another 257 of the cases,
officers appealed suspensions.44 And in thirty-four cases, officers

second decisions” and further quoting union officials believing that “police chiefs are prone
to overreach”).
37. Id. (quoting the San Antonio police chief as saying that “[t]o overturn a police chief’s
decision . . . is a disservice to the good order of the department” and that it “undermines a chief’s
authority and ignores the chief’s understanding of what serves the best interest of the community
and department”).
38. Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 235, 240 (1998) (explaining that the “selection of who will serve as an arbitrator
depends upon the willingness of both parties to a dispute . . . to accept that individual as an
arbitrator” and how the selection method may result in arbitrators frequently choosing to “split
the baby”).
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Part III (describing the methodology and dataset in more detail).
41. Infra Part III.
42. Infra Part III (explaining the demographic profile of law enforcement agencies in the
sample used in this Article and describing in more detail how this sample was sorted to focus on
patrol officers and other equivalent law enforcement professionals, omitting any cases involving
corrections officers, police dispatchers, forensics professionals, or crime scene investigators).
43. Infra Part III (representing 52.4% of the sample).
44. Infra Part III (representing 41.2% of the sample).

1030

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4:1023

appealed other types of disciplinary actions like letters of written
reprimand, demotions, or losses of job responsibilities. 45
Arbitrators on appeal reduced or overturned police discipline in
around 52% of cases.46 In about 46% of termination cases, arbitrators
ordered police departments to rehire previously terminated officers.47
On average, arbitrators reduced the length of disciplinary suspensions
by approximately 49%.48 Arbitrators gave several common justifications
for reductions in officer discipline. In a significant percentage of these
cases, arbitrators found the original discipline to be excessive relative
to the offense committed or relative to the punishments given to other
officers from that same department in the past.49 In a somewhat smaller
number of cases, arbitrators cited insufficient evidence or procedural
flaws in the investigation or adjudication of the original internal
disciplinary process.50
These findings are consistent with prior examinations of
arbitration outcomes of police disciplinary appeals.51 Further, these
findings make several contributions to the literature on police
accountability. First, these findings are potentially consistent with
prior scholarly characterizations of management decisionmaking in
internal police disciplinary systems as “uneven, arbitrary,” and, at
times, “entirely discretionary.”52 Under this view, the high rate of
disciplinary reductions or reversals by arbitrators on appeal may
suggest that many departments are failing to conduct sufficiently
robust investigations. Arbitration may be merely providing necessary
relief to officers aggrieved by a faulty disciplinary system. Additionally,
the relatively high rate of reductions or reversals in discipline may also
be a predictable outgrowth of the type of cases that proceed to
arbitration. Evidence from prior studies suggest that a substantial
number of appealed disciplinary sentences result in an eventual

45. Infra Part III (representing 5.4% of the sample).
46. See infra Section IV.B (finding that 327 out of 624 punishments were reduced or
overturned by arbitrators).
47. See infra Section IV.C (discussing arbitrators’ justifications for reversals and revisions of
disciplinary actions).
48. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the rates of arbitrators’ reversals and revisions of
disciplinary actions).
49. See infra Section IV.D (using this data to further argue that arbitration does less to
correct procedural due process concerns than to substitute the judgment of democratically elected
officials with the judgment of arbitrators).
50. Infra Section IV.D.
51. See infra Part IV (describing the consistency of these findings with prior academic and
media examinations of this topic).
52. Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 842 (2019).
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settlement with management.53 Once more, the cases that proceed to
arbitration may not be a random sample of all disciplinary cases, but
rather those cases where both management and the police union believe
they have a reasonable likelihood of success before an arbitrator. If this
is the case, then perhaps it should not be surprising that arbitration
results in each side succeeding roughly half of the time. Thus,
supporters of arbitration in police disciplinary cases may argue that the
data revealed by this study are consistent with the system working
as intended.
Second, and alternatively, critics of police arbitration may point
to these findings as consistent with prior critiques of the use of
arbitration on appeal in police disciplinary cases. Prior studies have
hypothesized that, as repeat players,54 arbitrators may be incentivized
to compromise in order to increase their chances of being selected for
future cases.55 Cities commonly employ alternative strike methods to
select arbitrators in police disciplinary appeals.56 Under this selection
strategy, the union or the aggrieved officer and the police department
are initially presented with a panel of arbitrators (typically seven or
another single digit odd number).57 Each side then alternatively strikes

53. See, e.g., William Bender & David Gambacorta, Fired, Then Rehired, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/a/philadelphia-police-problem-union-misconductsecret-20190912.html [https://perma.cc/F23N-A87M] (noting that a substantial number of the 170
cases reviewed by the Inquirer resulted in settlements before arbitration).
54. In the dataset for this Article, many of the arbitrators appear many times. For example,
one arbitrator in Texas (Harold E. Moore) appears nineteen times in the dataset. Another
arbitrator (Walt De Treux) appears twenty-one times, primarily in Pennsylvania.
55. See Iris, supra note 38, at 235, 240; see also Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Houston: The
Arbitration Experience, 5 POLICE Q. 132 (2002) (documenting how arbitrators in Houston appear
to be motivated to “split the baby” in order to be selected in future cases); Rushin, supra note 25,
at 576 (“The potential problem with using such a procedure [of arbitrator selection] in internal
disciplinary appeals is that it may incentivize arbitrators to consistently compromise on
punishment to increase their probability of being selected in future cases.”).
56. Rushin, supra note 25, at 574–75 (finding that in a sample of 656 police departments,
54% of the municipalities not only employed arbitration on appeal but also used this kind of
selection method).
57. See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Police Association,
Local #21, I.U.P.A., AFL-CIO 12 (2012), https://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/User/jkamme/
LaborContracts/Local_21_MPA_2010-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM4D-C8NM] (establishing such
an alternate strike approach); Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oakland and
Oakland Police Officers’ Association 20 (2015), https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/oak057845.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5KY-F7E4] (also using an alternate strike
approach); Agreement Between the City of Akron and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #7, at 8
(Nov.
15,
2016),
https://serb.ohio.gov/static/PDF/Contracts/2015/15-MED-10-1144.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XU4F-NZ5M] (also using an alternate strike approach); Labor Agreement
Between the City of Minneapolis and the Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis, at attach. H
(2017), http://www2.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@hr/documents/webcontent/wcmsp200131.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY8Y-9YP2] (establishing alternate striking methodology as well).
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names from the panel until one arbitrator remains.58 Prior scholars
have argued that this method of selecting arbitrators creates incentives
for arbitrators to meet in the middle in as many cases as possible so as
to increase their chances of winning out in this alternative strike
selection method in future cases.59 And scholars worry that this
incentive towards compromise may systematically lead to large
numbers of officers fired for misconduct having their terminations
downgraded to mere suspensions.60 The findings of this Article are
potentially consistent with this critique, although they fall short of
validating such a hypothesis. In the dataset examined in this Article,
arbitration hearings resulted in approximately half of all cases being
overturned or substantially reduced. And it resulted in a typical officer
serving roughly half of their original disciplinary suspension.
Third, and relatedly, this Article’s findings help inform the
broader normative debate about the appropriate scope of appellate
review in police disciplinary cases. Police unions may understandably
argue that police arbitration results in large numbers of reversals or
reductions in discipline because police departments regularly conduct
inadequate investigations or fail to provide officers with adequate
procedural rights in their so-called Loudermill hearings—that is, the
disciplinary hearings that police departments must ordinarily provide
officers before issuing some types of punishment, like termination.61
While arbitrators in many cases in the present dataset did identify
procedural flaws in a department’s internal disciplinary process, this
Article finds that such procedural justifications for reversals or
reductions were somewhat less common than other justifications for
58. See, e.g., Agreement Between Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign Patrol
and Sergeant 66 (2015), http://documents.ci.champaign.il.us/v/0B8wlv3QqeZtnT0h6elh0RVE2W
TQ [https://perma.cc/S5AA-SK4T] (establishing this kind of methodology); Collective Bargaining
Agreement Between City of Boulder and Boulder Police Officers Association 13 (2016),
https://www.lris.com/wp-content/uploads/contracts/boulder_co_police.pdf [https://perma.cc/87J2AJT8] (allowing for such a methodology); see also Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department & Las Vegas Police Protective Association 19 (2016),
https://lvppa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CBA-2016-2019-signed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
G7NL-HQSL] (establishing a procedure that allows the union to select two of five potential
arbitrators, with two of the additional arbitrators selected by the city and one selected by mutual
agreement between the parties).
59. See, e.g., Eric Litke, Unions Limit Police Accountability, but Moore Claim Exaggerates
Impact, POLITIFACT (July 10, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jul/10/gwenmoore/unions-limit-police-accountability-discipline
[https://perma.cc/RT2Q-CTW5]
(quoting
Professor Samuel Walker for the proposition that “the arbitration process consistently tends to
find a middle ground,” that is, “a reduction of department-ordered discipline”).
60. See generally Iris, supra note 38 (worrying about this very phenomenon).
61. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that before a public
servant can be deprived of their property right in their employment, the employer must provide a
pretermination hearing including a notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an
opportunity to respond to the charges).
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reductions or reversal. Arbitrators primarily cited procedural due
process concerns in a minority of all cases where they ultimately
overturned or reduced discipline.62 Instead, this Article finds that
reversals and reductions in police officer punishments are more
commonly the result of arbitrators concluding that the punishment is
excessive relative to the officer’s offense,63 the punishment fails to
consider mitigating circumstances in an officer’s service record,64 or
that the punishment is disparate relative to what other officers in that
agency have received in the past.65 In a smaller, but still significant,
number of cases, arbitrators simply disagreed with the factual
determinations reached by police supervisors or city officials. 66 Put
simply, in many cases, arbitrators overturned decisions by police chiefs
and city officials because of disagreements over facts or concerns about
proportionality, not because of procedural due process concerns. This
raises challenging normative and policy questions about the proper role
of arbitrators in overturning decisions made by more democratically
accountable actors. It further illustrates the real-world consequences of
the expansive standard of review given to arbitrators in police
disciplinary appeals cases.
Based on these observations, this Article considers how
communities could rethink the use of arbitration on appeal in police
disciplinary cases. In doing so, it considers approaches recently adopted
by Minnesota and Oregon in reforming their respective uses of police

62. This represented only 42 of the 327 cases where an arbitrator overturned or reduced
discipline on appeal. This number indicates the circumstances where an arbitrator overruled a
matter exclusively or primarily due to procedural due process issues. In a higher number of cases,
arbitrators listed procedural due process concerns as one of multiple issues (and often as an issue
of secondary concern).
63. See, e.g., Decision of Arbitrator, Employer and Command Officers Association, 148269AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148269 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 25, 2013) (Wolkinson, Arb.) (redacted
decision) (reinstating an officer after prior termination because of a belief that the penalty was
excessive relative to the offense).
64. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Steele Cnty., Case No. 06-PA-0620, at 8–9 (Minn.
Bureau of Mediation Servs. Oct. 26, 2006) (Befort, Arb.) (reducing a written reprimand to an oral
reprimand based in part on mitigating factors in the officer’s service record); Fairfield Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off. v. FOP, FMCS Case No. 07/01667, 124 BNA LA (BL) 1066, 1073 (Fed. Mediation &
Conciliation Serv. Nov. 5, 2007) (Chattman, Arb.) (“[T]he Arbitrator finds that although the
Grievant committed an act worthy of discipline, the penalty of discharge was too excessive
given the Grievant’s long term employment, commendations, previous work in positions
of responsibility . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Youngstown Police Ass’n, 134 BNA LA (BL) 1644, 1653–
54 (May 20, 2015) (Bell, Arb.) (reducing a fifteen-day suspension to a half-day suspension because
of concerns related to disparate treatment).
66. See, e.g., City of Junction City v. Junction City Police Officers’ Ass’n, FOP Lodge 43,
FMCS Case No. 181017/00551, 139 BNA LA (BL) 617, 624 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv
July 13, 2018) (Costello, Arb.) (disagreeing with the department’s factual judgment, overturning
an officer’s termination, and ordering reinstatement with back pay).
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arbitration. In Minnesota, state legislators passed a statute amending
the selection process for arbitrators in police disciplinary appeals.67
Under the new state law, rather than having arbitrators selected via an
alternative strike process, the state assigns arbitrators from a rotating
panel appointed by the state.68 Legislators hoped that this fix would
prevent both police unions and management from gaming the selection
process. Oregon has taken a different approach to reforming police
arbitration by limiting the authority of arbitrators. 69 The new Oregon
law requires all communities to develop disciplinary matrices that
establish specified ranges of punishment for different types of
misconduct.70 Then, when arbitrators hear disciplinary appeals, their
review authority is limited by the applicable disciplinary matrix.71 As
long as the arbitrator finds there to be sufficient evidence to prove an
officer engaged in the alleged misconduct and the punishment is
consistent with the community’s disciplinary matrix, the arbitrator
may not alter the punishment issued by management. This reform
effectively acts as a limitation on the scope of arbitration, while
simultaneously requiring departments to provide officers with
adequate notice of the disciplinary consequences of wrongdoing. This
Article argues that each state’s new law may represent a substantial

67. This change came as part of a broader reform measure, the Minnesota Police
Accountability Act of 2020. See Walker Orenstein & Peter Callaghan, The Legislature Just Passed
a Police Reform Bill. What It Does – and Doesn’t Do – to Reshape Law Enforcement in Minnesota,
MINNPOST (July 21, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2020/07/the-legislaturejust-passed-a-police-reform-bill-what-it-does-and-doesnt-do-to-reshape-law-enforcement-inminnesota [https://perma.cc/75RD-69Q9] (providing a summary of this overall legislative
package); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.892 (West 2020) (describing the new selection method, whereby
the commissioner of the Bureau of Mediation Services appoints a slate of possible arbitrators).
68. § 626.892(11) (“The parties shall not participate in, negotiate for, or agree to the selection
of an arbitrator or arbitration panel under this section.”).
69. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.706 (West 2020) (requiring, in certain situations, that
“arbitration award[s] must conform to [various listed] principles”); see also Dirk VanderHart,
Oregon Legislative Session on Police Accountability Coming Soon, OR. PUB. BROAD. (June 11, 2020,
5:08
PM),
https://www.opb.org/news/article/police-accountability-arbitration-oregon-specialsession-legislature [https://perma.cc/A6QS-PB6Q] (describing the legislative debate leading to the
passage of this change in Oregon law and detailing how it was designed to limit the ability of
arbitrators to overturn discipline when they agreed with the factual findings of the department);
Steve Benham, Police Reform Plan Restricts Arbitrator from Overturning Discipline Decisions,
KATU (June 22, 2020), https://katu.com/news/politics/police-reform-plan-restricts-arbitratorfrom-overturning-discipline-decisions [https://perma.cc/F7SY-WFSG] (similarly describing
the legislation).
70. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(7)(g) (describing the requirement of departments and
unions to develop disciplinary matrices during collective bargaining negotiations).
71. Id. § 243.706(3) (noting that if an “arbitrator makes a finding that misconduct has
occurred consistent with the law enforcement agency’s finding of misconduct,” then “the
arbitration award may not order any disciplinary action that differs from . . . the provisions of a
discipline guide or discipline matrix adopted by the agency”).

2021]

POLICE ARBITRATION

1035

step towards better balancing officers’ interests in due process with the
public’s important interest in accountability.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the internal
disciplinary process in American police departments and describes the
use of arbitration to adjudicate disciplinary appeals. Part II situates
this project within the existing literature on police disciplinary appeals
and police accountability more generally. Part III walks through this
study’s dataset and methodology. Part IV presents the results of this
empirical examination, and Part V considers some of the implications
of this study’s findings for the literature on police accountability.
I. INTERNAL POLICE DISCIPLINE AND THE ROLE OF APPEALS
In order to reform police agencies, supervisors must pursue
“rigorous enforcement of departmental regulations” and punish officers
engaged in wrongdoing.72 This punishment comes in the form of written
reprimands, demotions, suspensions, and, in some cases, terminations
of officers’ employment. Aggressive enforcement of internal rules both
“deters future misconduct and removes unfit officers from the streets.”73
But numerous police chiefs have argued that, because of labor and
employment protections afforded to police officers during internal
investigations and disciplinary proceedings, supervisors cannot
meaningfully oversee or control their departments. 74 And even if
a police supervisor does punish an officer for professional misconduct,
officers commonly receive reductions or reversals of discipline
on appeal.
This Part discusses the internal disciplinary process in
American police departments. It starts by discussing how labor and
employment provisions purportedly designed to protect officers’ due
process rights during internal investigations may impede
accountability efforts. Then, it focuses specifically on widespread use of
arbitration in police disciplinary appeals.
A. Internal Investigations of Police Misconduct
Existing legal scholarship on police reform focuses largely on
external accountability mechanisms. For example, scholars have
theorized on the potential benefits and limitations of the exclusionary
72. Rushin, supra note 25, at 549.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 31 (noting one police chief’s objection that overturning a
department’s decision to discharge an officer “undermines a chief’s authority and ignores the
chief’s understanding of what serves the best interest of the community and the department”).
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rule,75 civil rights litigation via § 1983,76 criminal prosecution,77 and
federal consent decrees78 in altering police behavior. But scholars have
spent comparatively less time considering the role of the internal
disciplinary process in promoting officer accountability and
constitutional policing. The internal disciplinary process determines
which officers will face employment penalties in cases of misconduct.
And the internal disciplinary process covers all types of wrongdoing,
including misconduct that may not rise to the level of warranting
evidentiary exclusion, criminal prosecution, or a civil lawsuit.79

75. The exclusionary rule prevents prosecutors from introducing at trial evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (expanding the exclusionary
rule to apply to state and local law enforcement misconduct). The Court crafted this rule in part
to deter police misconduct “by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Scholars have questioned the ability of this change to bring about widespread
reform in police departments. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 322–23 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the exclusionary rule may be
ineffective at bringing about significant change).
76. Victims of police misconduct may file a civil suit against the officer that violated their
constitutional rights and, in some cases, the agency that employed that officer. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
But succeeding in a § 1983 suit requires litigants to overcome the qualified immunity barrier,
which exempts police officers from civil suit under § 1983 unless their wrongdoing violated “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see
also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–41 (2002) (defining “clearly established” for § 1983
purposes); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–18 (1999) (further clarifying the definition of
“clearly established”). For a thorough critique of the qualified immunity doctrine, see Joanna C.
Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018). Individuals
can only reach the employing municipality in § 1983 cases where they are able to prove that the
officer’s conduct was the result of deliberate indifference in their failure to train or oversee their
employees. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (establishing deliberate indifference
for failure to train as the standard for municipal liability under § 1983); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978) (permitting municipal liability claims for some § 1983 cases).
Scholars have also critiqued § 1983 litigation by arguing that communities often do not properly
internalize the costs of these lawsuits. E.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits,
Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016). Research has also shown that
governments commonly indemnify officers, meaning that individual officers do not feel the
financial burdens of misconduct. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
885, 890 (2014) (illustrating the prevelance of indemnification policies across the country).
77. Perhaps the best database on criminal charges brought against police officers comes from
Bowling Green State University, which finds relatively few cases of criminal charges associated
with officer use of force historically. THE HENRY A. WALLACE POLICE CRIME DATABASE,
https://policecrime.bgsu.edu (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/977K-RFP]; see also
Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted
[https://perma.cc/4ZMZ-AMZA] (noting the scarcity of charges against police officers, despite
thousands of deaths at their hands since 2005).
78. For a detailed summary of the benefits and drawbacks of federal consent decrees, see
Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 1343, 1396–1418 (2015) (describing the Department of Justice’s use of consent decrees
and empirically assessing their effectiveness in promoting reform, as well as other
potential drawbacks).
79. For a more complete breakdown of the kinds of misconduct that ends up in this internal
disciplinary system, see infra Section IV.A.
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In many jurisdictions, this internal investigation is conducted by
an internal affairs division within a law enforcement agency.80 In order
to hold an officer accountable through the internal disciplinary process,
police supervisors or internal investigators must first identify and
investigate potential misconduct. In conducting these types of internal
investigations of police officer misconduct, investigators must navigate
“a complex web of labor and employment laws” that limits the kinds of
investigation techniques they may employ and the kind of evidence they
may use to build their case.81 These regulations are designed to protect
officers from management abuse and ensure adequate due process
rights during internal investigations. These limitations are derived
from several sources, including police union contracts, civil service
statutes, and law enforcement officer bills of rights (“LEOBRs”).
Roughly two-thirds of American police officers are part of labor
unions that bargain collectively with their employers over wages,
benefits, and other conditions of employment.82 In many jurisdictions,
this statutory language empowers police unions to negotiate internal
disciplinary procedures.83 In addition, numerous states and localities
have passed civil service laws or other local ordinances that further
restrict the ability of police supervisors to investigate and discipline
officers suspected of misconduct.84 And in another roughly twenty
states, the state legislature has passed a LEOBR designed to protect
officers’ due process rights during internal investigations.85 Together,
union contracts and LEOBRs establish limitations on the ability of
supervisors to investigate officer misconduct,86 including delays of

80. See Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee
Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1039–43, 1047–48, 1052 (2016) (providing a detailed
assessment of civilian review board models in the nation’s fifty largest cities; finding that a
minority of twenty-four have civilian review boards; also finding that these boards rarely have
extensive authority, instead vesting authority with internal investigators and police supervisors).
81. Rushin, supra note 25, at 557.
82. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (rev.
ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDQ6-CREN] (showing the
percentage of officers that are part of unions); Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police
Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 740–44 (2017) (describing the statutory provisions that permit
police officers to collectively bargain and how these statutes have been interpreted).
83. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 82, at 740–41.
84. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 797 (2012) (describing
the challenges potentially posed by civil service laws as they apply to law enforcement).
85. Aziz Z. Huq & Richard McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigations, 2016 CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 222.
86. For a complete, careful, and regularly updated explanation of the ways that union
contracts and LEOBRs may impede accountability, see CAMPAIGN ZERO, CHECK THE POLICE,
http://www.checkthepolice.org [https://perma.cc/BKH5-RB37].
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officer interrogations after suspected misconduct,87 requirements that
supervisors give officers access to incriminating evidence before
interrogations,88 bans on the investigation of anonymous complaints, 89
and requirements that supervisors purge officer disciplinary records
that could be used to evaluate patterns of officer misconduct over time.90
Prior research has suggested that the existence of these extensive
limitations on internal investigations may contribute to higher rates of
officer misconduct. For example, one study by Professors Dhammika
Dharmapala, Richard McAdams, and John Rappaport found that the
introduction of collective bargaining to Florida Sheriff’s Departments
was associated with a statistically significant increase in complaints
and officer violence against civilians.91 But a recent study by Professor
Felipe Goncalves failed to find statistically significant increases in

87. See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, at 4 (2012), https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/
dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA2012-2017_2.20.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8G7N-GDUN] (establishing rigid delay periods before some interrogations); Meet & Confer
Agreement Between the Houston Police Officers’ Union and the City of Houston, Texas 39–41
(2015),
https://hpou.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-2018-MC-Draft-Prior-to-Ratification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UDA8-3RDH] (providing a general forty-eight hour waiting period); Agreement
Between the City of Norman, Oklahoma and the Fraternal Order of Police – Lodge No. 122, at 6
(2016),
https://www.normanok.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2020-06/FOP%20Contract%
20FYE%2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RWL-T62E] (providing a ten working-day delay to secure
representation before being interviewed).
88. See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Green Bay and Green Bay Professional Police
Association
49
(2016),
https://greenbaywi.gov/DocumentCenter/View/306/Police-OfficersAgreement-PDF [https://perma.cc/KNU5-N78U] (providing officers with access to description and
summary of all physical evidence against them prior to interview); Memorandum of
Understanding: The City of Phoenix and Phoenix Law Enforcement Association 12 (2016),
https://azplea.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/MOU-2016-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5428GV6X] (providing officers with “any material that is being used as the basis for an allegation of
misconduct” including “video, audio, photographs, or documents”).
89. See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, supra note 87, at 4 (“No anonymous complaints made against
an Officer shall be made the subject of a Complaint Register investigation unless the allegation is
a violation of the Illinois Criminal Code, the criminal code of another state of the United States or
a criminal violation of a federal statute.”).
90. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police
Patrolmen’s
Association
Non-Civilian
Personnel
7
(2013),
https://serb.ohio.gov/
static/PDF/Contracts/2010/10-CON-05-0536.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UGA3-EBGC]
(requiring
removal of disciplinary action from personnel file after two years and verbal or written reprimands
after six months).
91. Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, Collective Bargaining
Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. &
Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 831, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095217
[https://perma.cc/LW4J-XJE6]; see also Abdul N. Rad, Police Institutions and Police Abuse:
Evidence from the U.S. (Apr. 23, 2018) (M.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3246419 [https://perma.cc/4BCF-CTQD].
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officer misconduct in Florida law enforcement agencies after the
introduction of unionization.92
If a supervisor or internal affairs division within a police
department is able to uncover evidence of wrongdoing by an officer,
officers are often guaranteed a predisciplinary hearing. This right to a
predisciplinary hearing comes from Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that many public
sector employees, like police officers, have a property right in their
continued employment.93 Thus, deprivation of this property right by the
government triggers certain due process requirements, including a
written notice of charges, explanation of evidence against them, and an
opportunity to be heard.94 This Loudermill hearing serves as an
important check, particularly pretermination, to ensure that
reasonable grounds exist for the proposed discipline.95 So, take the
example involving Seattle Officer Shepherd’s use of force against the
handcuffed woman from the Introduction. In that case, before Chief
O’Toole could terminate Officer Shepherd’s employment, the city
provided him with an explanation of the alleged policy violations and
the evidence supporting the city’s position.96
During the Loudermill hearing, Officer Shepherd had an
opportunity to defend himself and respond to the charges. He argued
that his actions were appropriate under the circumstances. He
emphasized his prior contacts with Durden-Bosley and her history with
law enforcement.97 He provided his own competing experts, who argued
that his use of force was justified under the circumstances. 98 He asked
the city to consider the totality of his service record and training

92. Felipe Goncalves, Do Police Unions Increase Misconduct? 20–21 (Mar. 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d9a8d71e5b6c72dc2a90f1/t/60622724b6a90
2732b636324/1617045285669/Goncalves_Unions.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZV7-C2NL].
93. 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985) (“The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both
lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment.”).
94. Id. at 546:
The essential requirements of due process, and all that respondents seek or the Court
of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity to respond. . . . The tenured public
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation
of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.
95. But of course, this right is limited in scope. And the Loudermill hearing need not be
exhaustive, particularly when there exists a post-termination opportunity to appeal. As the Court
reiterated near the end of the opinion, “We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by
a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative
procedures as provided by the Ohio statute.” Id. at 547–48.
96. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (providing summary under
“Specification” subheading).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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history.99 Finally, he argued that he was treated differently than other
officers who engaged in similar conduct, in part because of his race.
(Officer Shepherd is Black.)100
After hearing all the evidence during this Loudermill
proceeding, Chief O’Toole issued a fairly detailed written decision.101 In
it, she said that she found Officer Shepherd’s competing experts to be
“unconvincing” and believed that his arguments conflated lawfulness
under the Fourth Amendment with permissibility under Seattle’s
more stringent use of force policy.102 She then walked through a
detailed assessment of how she believed Officer Shepherd’s conduct
violated the use of force policy and warranted termination of his
employment, particularly when viewed in conjunction with his previous
disciplinary history.103
Attached to the end of Chief O’Toole’s findings was a page
entitled “Appeal of Final Disposition,” which laid out Officer Shepherd’s
options for challenging the decision she issued in the Loudermill
hearing.104 As discussed in the next Section, even after a police
supervisor issues a disciplinary decision, this is often just the beginning
of the process. Before the punishment is final, officers must ordinarily
be given a chance to appeal.
B. Disciplinary Appeals
Once an officer receives a disciplinary sentence issued by a police
supervisor, civilian review board, or city administrator, the officer
generally has an opportunity to appeal the decision. 105 Prior studies
suggest that many police departments afford officers with similar
appeal procedures. To begin with, departments commonly give officers
multiple layers of appeal, normally culminating in binding arbitration
as a final layer of protection.106 Communities use a couple of common
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (providing Chief O’Toole’s decision under “Determination of the Chief” subheading).
102. Id.
103. Id. (“You previously received a ten day suspension in 2009 for violating a different SPD
policy where your failure resulted in the death of a victim; as such, you should be acutely aware of
the potentially dire consequences of disregarding policies created to protect the public.”).
104. Id.
105. In some cities, this appeals process helps bolster an otherwise informal or less rigorous
earlier determination that an officer engaged in misconduct. The law allows the original
Loudermill hearing to be relatively cursory in jurisdictions where officers are granted a full
hearing on appeal. In other jurisdictions, officers are afforded elaborate or robust hearings both in
the initial predisciplinary hearing and on appeal in a postdisciplinary hearing.
106. Rushin, supra note 25, at 571 (“The median police department in the dataset offers police
officers up to four layers of appellate review in disciplinary cases.”).
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approaches to select the identity of arbitrators that will hear these
appeals. Some unionized agencies negotiate over the identity of the
outside arbitrator that will hear appeals as part of the collective
bargaining process. More commonly, though, police departments
employ an alternative strike process or some similar selection
methodology.107 Under this selection method, the parties are presented
with a panel of arbitrators.108 Each side then alternatively strikes one
name from this panel until a single name remains.109 That person then
becomes the arbitrator for the appeal.110
After the parties have selected an arbitrator, many communities
give this decisionmaker authority to conduct something akin to a de
novo hearing to review conclusions reached by management.111 During
this hearing, the arbitrator is often tasked with determining whether
“just cause” existed for the disciplinary action, and the employer bears
the burden of proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence or, in
some cases, by clear and convincing evidence.112 In defining “just cause,”
it is common for arbitrators to employ the so-called Daugherty test, or
to employ an understanding of “just cause” that resembles this test.113
This seven-prong test, developed by Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty in
1964, asks:
1. Did the Employer give the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible or
probable consequences of the employee’s disciplinary conduct?
2. Was the Employer’s rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) the orderly,
efficient, and safe operation of the Employer’s business, and (b) the performance that the
Employer might properly expect of the employee?

107. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Fairbanks and Public
Safety Employees Association, Fairbanks Police Department Chapter Local 83, at 11 (Dec. 23,
2011), http://www.psea.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2011-City-PSEA-CBA-agreement-04-0312-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK3X-2YUV] (establishing alternative striking methodology from
prearranged list of arbitrators); Agreement Between City of Corpus Christi and the Corpus Christi
Police Officers’ Association 18–19 (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.corpuschristipoa.net/
docs/contracts/2015_2019_City_CCPOA_FINAL_CONTRACT.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4S8-VQZR]
[hereinafter Corpus Christi Agreement] (establishing alternative strike procedure).
108. Corpus Christi Agreement, supra note 107, at 19 (providing that the department should
receive a panel of seven assigned arbitrators from the National Academy of Arbitrators or another
qualified agency).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Rushin, supra note 25, at 576–78 (explaining that around 70% of the jurisdictions in that
study provide a de novo hearing on appeal).
112. Tyler Adams, Note, Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does It
Take to Fire a Bad Cop?, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 140–41 (2016) (describing the
commonality of these standards in review of police disciplinary cases).
113. John J. Hindera & Jyl J. Josephson, Reinventing the Public Employer-Employee
Relationship: The Just Cause Standard, 22 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 98, 105 (1998) (quoting Enter. Wire,
Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BL) 359, 363–64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.)) (discussing the seven-prong
Daugherty test).
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3. Did the Employer, before administering the discipline to an employee, make an effort
to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order
of management?
4. Was the Employer’s investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
5. At the investigation, did the “judge” obtain substantial proof that the employee was
guilty as charged?
6. Has the Employer applied its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without
discrimination to all employees?
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the Employer in a particular case
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven offense, and (b) the
record of the employee in his service with the Employer? 114

While this test is referenced frequently in police disciplinary
appeals, it is by no means a rigid or exhaustive standard of review. As
one arbitrator remarked in a police arbitration award from Michigan,
“although it is hard to define, a good arbitrator knows whether just
cause exists when s/he reviews the facts, evidence and testimony in the
case that has been presented to him or her for decision.”115 In any event,
“just cause” standards generally provide arbitrators with broad
authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented against the
officer, the procedural due process protections afforded to the officer
during the investigation and earlier adjudication, the proportionality
of the punishment to the alleged offense, and the consistency
of the punishment with that given to other officers accused of
similar wrongdoing.116
Although collective bargaining agreements and internal
departmental policies describe arbitration in this context as an appeal,
that name may be a bit of a misnomer, at least as we normally use the
word in other areas of law. In the American justice system, appeals are
normally limited in scope.117 For example, while litigants may be able
to challenge to an appellate court the legal decisions made at their trial,
litigants often have little opportunity to challenge factual findings
made by juries or punishments issued by trial courts within the
statutorily authorized range.118 In most cases, appeals in our criminal

114. Id.
115. In re Emp. & Police Officers Ass’n of Mich., 137 BNA LA (BL) 1534, 1542 (2017) (Scales,
Arb.) (emphasis omitted) (redacted).
116. See Hindera & Josephson, supra note 113, at 106–10 (discussing the procedural due
process goals served by the just cause standard).
117. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993 (1986) (concluding that in the United States,
“appellate courts almost never decide cases de novo”).
118. Id. (noting that the “primary function” of an appellate court is to correct legal errors made
at the trial court below).
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justice system involve challenging the procedural sufficiency of the
earlier trial, not the substantive findings of the jury, unless those
findings are clearly erroneous or unreasonable.119
By contrast, appeals of internal disciplinary action against
police officers operate, effectively, as an opportunity to re-adjudicate the
matter in front of an arbitrator, with the disciplinary sentence issued
by the police department as a ceiling for the possible punishment. This
realization has significant implications for the practical ability of a
community to oversee its police department. Take the example of
Detroit, Michigan, which has created a seemingly powerful civilian
review board.120 This seven-person board purports to be one of the few
in the United States to have the power to subpoena information,
conduct independent investigations, and discipline officers.121 At first
glance, Detroit looks like a model of civilian control of law enforcement.
But like most big cities, Detroit has established a disciplinary appeals
process that allows officers to challenge to an arbitrator any discipline
handed down by the city or the civilian review board.122 And the officers’
union contract grants this arbitrator authority to determine
independently whether just cause exists for punishment.123 This
procedural redundancy may diminish the practical importance of the
city’s civilian oversight apparatus, because “[t]he ultimate power
resides with an appellate arbitrator.”124
As discussed in more detail in the Article, this transferring of
oversight ability from democratically accountable actors to arbitrators
may result in relatively frequent reductions in officer discipline. And,
as Judge Thelton Henderson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California explained, “[j]ust like any failure to impose
appropriate discipline by the (police) chief or city administrator, any
reversal of appropriate discipline at arbitration undermines the very
objectives” of any police reform effort.125
119. Id. at 993–95; see also Robert L. Stern, Review of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A
Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 72 (1944) (explaining how, ordinarily, determinations
of facts by earlier adjudicators are treated with “considerable, though varying degrees of, respect”
on appeal).
120. Ofer, supra note 80, app. at 1055.
121. Id. at 1043 (“[T]he only review board that has a leadership structure that is not majority
nominated by the mayor and is empowered with subpoena, disciplinary, and policy review
authorities, is Detroit’s.”).
122. Master Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the Detroit Police Officers Association
11–16 (Oct. 2014), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/55a26d54
e4b02ee06b2a86ed/1436708180775/Detroit+police+contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/83U7-ZKC6].
123. Id. at 11–13.
124. Rushin, supra note 25, at 583.
125. Matthew Artz, Judge Orders Investigation into Oakland’s Police Arbitration Losses,
MERCURY NEWS,
https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/08/14/judge-orders-investigation-into-
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II. EXISTING LITERATURE
A handful of existing academic studies have found that
arbitration is the most common mechanism for adjudicating police
disciplinary appeals. And a number of media examinations have found
that a significant number of police disciplinary appeals result in the
reversal or reduction of disciplinary penalties against officers.
Nevertheless, less research has examined the outcomes of police
disciplinary appeals—specifically, the outcomes of appellate arbitration
in police disciplinary cases. As this Part explains, this study seeks to
consider this important research question. The existing studies roughly
fall into three general categories.
First, some prior studies have found that arbitration is a
common feature of police disciplinary appeals across American police
departments.126 Because these arbitrators often reevaluate police
discipline in de novo proceedings, at least one scholar has concluded
that arbitrators—and not civilian review boards, police chiefs, or
mayors—are the “true adjudicators of internal discipline” in the United
States.127 These findings were roughly consistent with other prior
research that concluded that arbitration was a common feature of police
disciplinary procedures and police union contracts.128 Nevertheless,
these existing studies do not explore the outcomes of police disciplinary
procedures. Instead, they are focused on the procedural choices made
by cities in developing disciplinary appeals procedures.
Second, a few legal studies have hypothesized about the ways in
which arbitration in police disciplinary cases may impede
accountability. Most notably, Professor Mark Iris conducted two indepth case studies examining the disciplinary appeals process in

oaklands-police-arbitration-losses (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 7:03 AM) [https://perma.cc/7LZCHRRM].
126. For example, one recent study, which examined the police disciplinary appeals procedures
articulated in 656 law enforcement collective bargaining agreements from a geographically diverse
range of police departments, found binding arbitration to be common. Rushin, supra note 25. For
other examples, see infra note 128.
127. Id. at 582.
128. A number of prior studies by academics and civil rights activists point to arbitration as a
potential problem stemming from collective bargaining agreements or state and local laws. See,
e.g., DERAY MCKESSON, SAMUEL SINYANGWE, JOHNETTA ELZIE & BRITTNEY PACKNETT, CAMPAIGN
ZERO, POLICE UNION CONTRACTS AND POLICE BILL OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdfe28a1f0/14
67217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union+Contract+Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WBG8TEQR] (identifying how contracts can vest authority in nondemocratic actors in a way that limits
community oversight of police); Rad, supra note 91, at 51–52 (identifying arbitration as a potential
barrier to accountability).
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Chicago129 and Houston.130 He found that in both jurisdictions,
arbitrators in the aggregate routinely cut police discipline roughly in
half.131 This Article’s study is distinct from and builds on Professor Iris’s
prior work. Professor Iris’s studies looked at individual jurisdictions. As
Professor Iris wondered in his most recent study from 2002, “Can this
pattern [found in Chicago and Houston] be documented in yet another
major city police agency? This is a tantalizing question that for now
remains unanswered. This suggests a fruitful area for future
research.”132 This study builds on Professor Iris’s work by answering his
call for more expansive future research into police arbitrations.
Third, a few media examinations have explored the outcomes of
police disciplinary appeals, particularly as they relate to the rehiring of
previously terminated officers. Most prominently, Kimbriell Kelly,
Wesley Lowery, and Steven Rich of the Washington Post conducted one
of the most well-known studies on the rehiring of fired officers.133 They
found that over a ten-year period, nearly 24% of officers terminated in
thirty-seven agencies were rehired on appeal.134 And they found that
the disciplinary appeals processes in some police departments—like
those in San Antonio, Denver, and Philadelphia—have forced the
departments to rehire the large majority of terminated officers. 135 A

129. See Iris, supra note 38.
130. See Iris, supra note 55.
131. Id. at 141–42 tbl.1 (showing that of the 899 total days of suspension issued between 1994
and 1998 in the City of Houston, 480 days were upheld and 419 days were overturned, suggesting
“[c]ollectively the individual cases add up to a systematic pattern of arbitrators reducing the
disciplinary actions of the chief of police by close to 50%”).
132. Id. at 147 (citation omitted). It is also worth noting that in laying out a roadmap for future
research on arbitration, Iris speculated that some commercially available databases are not
representative of the universe of all police arbitration opinions. Id. This study addresses this very
problem by combining data from one comprehensive state database in Minnesota (which reports
all cases processed by the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services) with one of the largest national
databases. As explained in more detail in Part IV, the results of this study suggest that arbitrators
across the 512 arbitration opinions in the Bloomberg database behaved nearly identically overall
to arbitrators in the 112 arbitration opinions in Minnesota. And arbitrators in both databases
reached mostly identical results to the arbitrators in Iris’s smaller examinations of opinions in
Houston and Chicago. Put simply, this Article responds to the call for more research proposed by
Iris nearly twenty years ago and finds through a national analysis that his observations about the
arbitration process are not just true in Chicago and Houston, but possibly in jurisdictions all across
the country. Additionally, Iris conducted his studies around two or more decades ago. And unlike
the present study, Iris spent less time considering the arbitrators’ justifications for reducing or
reversing discipline. By conducting a wider, national examination of a larger number of arbitration
outcomes and supplementing this with normative recommendations for reforming the police
disciplinary appeals process, this study updates, builds on, and expands Professor Iris’s
important work.
133. See Kelly et al., supra note 31.
134. Id.
135. Id. (showing that 31 of 44 officers fired in San Antonio were ordered rehired, as were 44
of 71 in Philadelphia, and 21 of 31 in Denver).
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number of other reporters have found similar patterns, in individual
agencies or across individual states, of departments being forced to
rehire previously terminated officers after appeals. For example, Jon
Collins of Minnesota Public Radio found around half of all officers
terminated across Minnesota over a five-year period got their jobs back
via arbitration on appeal.136
While important, these media investigations leave many
important questions unanswered. For one thing, several of these
examinations have been focused on a handful of large police
departments that may not be representative of the country as a whole.
These prior examinations have also focused primarily on disciplinary
terminations, not other types of discipline (like suspensions, demotions,
or written reprimands) that are also appealable to arbitration.137
Additionally, these prior media examinations were outcome oriented.
Their focus was on the frequency of officers getting rehired; they did not
systematically explore the justifications given for these rehiring
decisions or the procedures employed to arrive at this result. To the
extent that existing appellate procedures for police officers may result
in undesirable outcomes—namely, the rehiring of unfit officers—it is
important to study this procedure in-depth rather than just the
outcomes of police disciplinary systems more generally.
One recent study has examined arbitrators’ justifications for
rehiring terminated officers. Tyler Adams conducted one of the few
existing studies to date on the outcomes of police arbitrations by
examining a dataset of ninety-two police arbitration decisions
challenging officer terminations.138 While important, Adams’s study
136. Jon Collins, Half of Fired Minnesota Police Officers Get Their Jobs Back Through
Arbitration, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/
2020/07/09/half-of-fired-minnesota-police-officers-get-their-jobs-back-through-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/9BBC-BULD] (relying on data from the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation
Services). This mirrors a slew of similar local news reports that have found that police officers
frequently succeed in overturning disciplinary action on appeal. For example, Robert Angien and
Dan Horn of the Cincinnati Enquirer found that roughly a quarter of disciplinary suspensions
were reduced or reversed in that city, while a similar examination by Jodi S. Cohen of ProPublica
and Jennifer Smith Richards of the Chicago Tribune found that sanctions are reversed or
remanded in around 85% of cases in Chicago. Robert Angien & Dan Horn, Police Discipline
Inconsistent: Sanctions Most Likely to Be Reduced, CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct. 21, 2001, at A1; Jennifer
Smith Richards & Jodi S. Cohen, Cop Disciplinary System Undercut, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2017),
http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=bc73d166-b1f0-4d8b9ff9-0529bad5bd7a [https://perma.cc/L9FM-9A2P]; see also Dan Stamm, Police Commish Angry
that 90 Percent of Fired Officers Get Jobs Back, NBC PHILA., http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/
news/local/Police-Officers-Get-Jobs-Back-194100131.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2013, 11:02 AM)
[https://perma.cc/46QM-D793].
137. See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 31 (focusing exclusively on firing and rehiring of officers).
138. Adams, supra note 112. Adams examined the Bloomberg database, which this study also
partially relies upon. He found that in rehiring terminated officers, arbitrators commonly cited
inadequate investigations, lack of proof about the guilt of the discharged officer, and mitigating
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does not foreclose the need for additional research on this topic. This
Article builds on Adams’s important work in several ways—by
analyzing a larger dataset of police arbitration awards over a longer
period of time,139 by focusing on a somewhat different set of variables,140
and by expanding the analysis of police arbitration awards to not just
those involving terminations, but also those involving suspensions,
written reprimands, demotions, or other forms of discipline. This
further builds our understanding of the role of arbitration in the police
disciplinary process across the country.
Perhaps most importantly, though, this Article reaches a
different conclusion than Adams’s study. Adams argues that it is
unfortunate that, “due to the media’s propensity for circulating
sensationalist headlines, they rarely provide complete and accurate
accounts of the details of police misconduct arbitration decisions.”141 He
ultimately concludes that departments themselves, not arbitrators or
the procedural choices made by jurisdictions in employing arbitration,
are often to blame for the high rate of officer reinstatements. In his
view, arbitrators—and the system of arbitration generally—serve an
important role because, unlike the department, “arbitrators care about
who the officer is. They care about whether an officer is sufficiently
trustworthy to deserve a second chance.”142
As explained in Part V, this Article reaches a somewhat
different, although not necessarily inconsistent, conclusion. It argues
that while appellate arbitration can (and does) help correct some
particularly egregious cases of unjustified or excessive punishment, the
existing system as described in this Article may also raise broader
questions about officer accountability, democratic accountability, and
organizational management of police departments. In doing so, the
methodology employed by this Article seeks to contribute to the existing
literature, as described in the next Part.

circumstances in the officer’s personnel file. Id. at 133–34, 146–152. He also conducted nuanced
analyses of the standard of proof required by arbitrators in these cases and the percentage of cases
involving off-duty behavior or direct mistreatment of citizens. Id. at 140–41, 153–54.
139. By bringing together state and national databases, this study looks at over six hundred
arbitration decisions across twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico over
fifteen years.
140. The present study codes these decisions based on eighteen different variables, some of
which are informed by the studies of police arbitration by Adams, Iris, Rushin, and other prior
scholars, but still represent my own personal choices about the appropriate variable definitions
and applications for this particular project.
141. Adams, supra note 112, at 135.
142. Id. at 156.
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III. METHODOLOGY
This Article examines a dataset of 624 arbitration opinions
involving police disciplinary appeals decided between 2006 and 2020,
constructed through sorting and combining arbitration awards from
two separate resources: (1) the Bloomberg Law Labor Arbitration
Awards database, one of the largest available commercial databases,
and (2) the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, one of the only
publicly accessible state databases of police arbitration awards.143
In sorting both databases, I focused specifically on opinions
involving police officers, sheriff’s deputies, and other similar law
enforcement professionals. I removed any cases dealing with
corrections officers, security guards, and police dispatchers.144 This left
a dataset of 624 arbitration opinions related to disciplinary appeals for
police officers authored by over two hundred different arbitrators in at
least twenty-eight states,145 Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Of the 624 opinions analyzed as part of this Article, 333 of them
involved appeals of officer terminations. Another 257 of the cases
involved officers appealing suspensions. And thirty-four cases involved
officers appealing other types of disciplinary actions like letters of
written reprimand, demotions, or loss of job responsibilities.
The dataset represents a wide and diverse sample of American
law enforcement agencies. It includes many cases from the primary
municipal police departments in several of the nation’s largest cities,

143. Arbitration Awards, MINN. BUREAU OF MEDIATION SERVS., https://mn.gov/bms/
arbitration/awards (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6DUC-RMNJ]. In looking at both
the Bloomberg database and the Minnesota database, this study combines two databases used in
prior academic and media examinations of police arbitration awards. See Adams, supra note 112
(conducting a similar examination of the Bloomberg database over a shorter period of time and
focused on a smaller number of cases); Collins, supra note 136 (also conducting a similar analysis
of the Minnesota database over a shorter period of time and focused on a smaller number of cases).
144. From the Bloomberg database, this removed approximately 317 arbitration awards. This
required reviewing each case individually to sort them based on the exact job description of
the grievant.
145. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. In a number of the opinions, the
location of the department, including the state, was redacted because of state law, local ordinances,
or the department’s collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the total number of states represented
in this dataset is likely larger than twenty-eight.

2021]

POLICE ARBITRATION

1049

including Austin, Texas;146 Chicago, Illinois;147 Cleveland, Ohio;148
Columbus, Ohio;149 Fort Worth, Texas;150 Honolulu, Hawaii;151 Houston,
Texas;152 Minneapolis, Minnesota;153 Newark, New Jersey;154 Oakland,
California;155 Omaha, Nebraska;156 Saint Paul, Minnesota;157 San Jose,
California;158 and Tulsa, Oklahoma.159 The dataset also includes cases
from police departments in medium-sized communities, like
Chesterfield, Michigan;160 Kalamazoo, Michigan;161 Killeen, Texas;162
Pharr, Texas;163 Stillwater, Oklahoma;164 Waco, Texas;165 Woodbury,

146. City of Austin v. Combined L. Enf’t Ass’n of Tex., 123 BNA LA (BL) 1042 (Dec. 9, 2006)
(Guttshall, Arb.).
147. City of Chi. Dep’t of Police v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 7, 07-150, 2008 BNA LA
Supp. (BL) 119401 (Dec. 23, 2008) (Bierig, Arb.).
148. City of Cleveland v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 8, 53-390-L-00425-09, 127 BNA
LA (BL) 1620 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 19, 2010) (Ruben, Arb.).
149. City of Columbus v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Cap. City Lodge No. 9, 2010 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 118947 (June 26, 2010) (Goldberg, Arb.).
150. City of Fort Worth, CSC-01-2010-HP, 127 BNA LA (BL) 1021 (May 15, 2010)
(Moore, Arb.).
151. Honolulu Police Dep’t v. State of Haw. Org. of Police Officers, 0-2007-003, 127 BNA LA
(BL) 148 (Oct. 23, 2009) (Henner, Arb.).
152. City of Hous. Police Dep’t v. Individual Grievant, 70-390-00502-10, 128 BNA LA (BL) 910
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 22, 2010) (Moore, Arb.).
153. Police Officers Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation
Servs. Dec. 30, 2015) (Jacobs, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20151230-Mpls.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U57Q-7H9L].
154. City of Newark v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Newark Lodge 12, 04-0534, 122 BNA LA (BL)
242 (N.J. Bureau of Mediation Jan. 4, 2006) (Smith, Arb.).
155. City of Oakland v. Oakland Police Officers’ Ass’n, 09-0707, 128 BNA LA (BL) 1217 (Mar.
2, 2011) (Gaba, Arb.).
156. Omaha Police Union, Local 101 v. City of Omaha, FMCS 07-03391, 2007 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 119735 (Dec. 5, 2007) (Fincher, Arb.).
157. Saint Paul Police Fed’n v. City of Saint Paul (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Oct. 12,
2012) (Befort, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20121012-St--Paul-Police.pdf [https://perma.
cc/KNG8-JGKD].
158. City of San Jose v. Individual Grievant, ARB-10-0153, 129 BNA LA (BL) 1313 (Nov. 15,
2011) (Reeves, Arb.).
159. City of Tulsa v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 93, 10/60154, 130 BNA LA (BL) 714 (May
21, 2012) (McReynolds, Arb.).
160. Charter Twp. of Chesterfield v. Police Officers Lab. Council (POLC) Union, 09-55992,
2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119375 (Jan. 12, 2010) (McDonald, Arb.).
161. City of Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo Pub. Safety Officers Ass’n, 54-390-00148-09, 128 BNA
LA (BL) 749 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Nov. 12, 2010) (Hornberger, Arb.).
162. City of Killeen v. Police Officer T.B., AAA Case A 71 390 00789 09, 2010 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 118818 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 10, 2010) (Jennings, Arb.).
163. City of Pharr v. Combined Law Enf’t Ass’n of Tex., 127 BNA LA (BL) 1025 (May 15, 2010)
(Jennings, Arb.).
164. City of Stillwater v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 102, 12/51012-1, 130 BNA LA (BL)
913 (May 8, 2012) (Chapdelaine, Arb.).
165. City of Waco v. Sergeant P.M., 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 118819 (May 15, 2010)
(Jennings, Arb.).
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Minnesota;166 and Youngstown, Ohio.167 And the dataset includes many
cases from small police departments, including those in places like
Eaton, Ohio;168 Hialeah Gardens, Florida;169 Markham, Illinois;170
Milford, Michigan;171 Piqua, Ohio;172 Sandy, Oregon;173 and
Taylorsville, Illinois.174 Finally, the dataset includes arbitration awards
from numerous sheriff’s departments, including those in places like
Erie County175 and Hamilton County176 in Ohio, and San Joaquin
County177 and Yuba County178 in California. It also includes several
cases involving federal law enforcement agencies.179
It is important to recognize the limitations of this merged
dataset. Per the terms of local collective bargaining agreements or
municipal ordinances, many arbitration hearings are confidential,
meaning that those awards will not be included in this dataset.180
166. City of Woodbury v. Woodbury Police Officers Ass’n, 09-PA-0952, 2010 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 118973 (Aug. 16, 2010) (Bognanno, Arb.).
167. City of Youngstown v. Ohio Patrolman’s Benevolent Ass’n, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
119807 (Mar. 10, 2011) (Paolucci, Arb.).
168. City of Eaton v. FOP/Ohio Lab. Council, 14/01484-6, 134 BNA LA (BL) 672 (Sept. 12,
2014) (Tolley, Arb.).
169. City of Hialeah Gardens v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Fla. State Lodge, 32-390-00161-10,
128 BNA LA (BL) 367 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Aug. 23, 2010) (Wolfson, Arb.).
170. City of Markham Police Dep’t v. State and Mun. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Loc.
726, 08/072, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119262 (Feb. 11, 2010) (Goldstein, Arb.).
171. Vill. of Milford v. Police Officers Council, Grievance: #10-34/J.R, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
119906 (Dec. 28, 2010) (McDonald, Arb.).
172. City of Piqua v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, 01/14, 133 BNA LA (BL) 1811 (Sept. 3, 2014)
(Weatherspoon, Arb.).
173. City of Sandy v. Sandy Police Ass’n, 129 BNA LA (BL) 669 (Aug. 12, 2011)
(Calhoun, Arb.).
174. City of Taylorville v. Policeman’s Benevolent Lab. Comm., 0955293, 129 BNA LA (BL)
616 (June 23, 2011) (Goldstein, Arb.).
175. Erie Cnty. Sheriff v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., 110310/01887-6,
129 BNA LA (BL) 1070 (Oct. 18, 2011) (Heekin, Arb.).
176. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., 0503516-8, 2006 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119785 (Apr. 18, 2006) (Cohen, Arb.).
177. County of San Joaquin v. San Joaquin Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n, 128 BNA LA (BL) 1096
(Dec. 16, 2010) (Riker, Arb.).
178. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Cnty. of Yuba, 74 390 00172 10, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
119463 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 16, 2010) (Riker, Arb.).
179. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Nat’l Border Patrol
Council of the Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 10/0826-04759-3,129 BNA LA (BL) 1464 (Nov. 21, 2011)
(Skulina, Arb.); U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 129 BNA LA (BL)
1461 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Abrams, Arb.).
180. See, e.g., Agreement Between Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign Patrol
and
Sergeant
66
(July
1,
2015),
http://documents.ci.champaign.il.us/v/
0B8wlv3QqeZtnT0h6elh0RVE2WTQ [https://perma.cc/KDR2-TXFC] (establishing a confidential
proceeding); Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Colton and the Colton Police
Officers Association 7 (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ci.colton.ca.us/DocumentCenter/
View/3436/2017-05-16-MOU---Colton-Police-Officers-Association-Term-020117---013119?bidId=
[https://perma.cc/U9MB-JR4K] (“Grievance arbitration hearings shall be private.”).

2021]

POLICE ARBITRATION

1051

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the combined dataset
constructed for this Article provides a somewhat reasonably
representative sample of police arbitration outcomes. First, at least one
prior study found that jurisdictions across the country use similar
procedures for adjudicating police disciplinary appeals.181 The majority
of collective bargaining agreements dictate a fairly similar disciplinary
appeals process—one that involves arbitrators, selected through
alternative strike processes (or similar selection procedures) issuing
binding rulings after de novo hearings.182 Indeed, nearly all of the
arbitration opinions in the present dataset used this same basic
procedural process. Given these procedural similarities across police
disciplinary appeals, the size of the dataset, the fifteen-year period
covered by the dataset, and the wide geographical variation in the
dataset, it seems possible that the dataset provides a useful cross
section of police arbitration decisions in the United States.
And second, the overall outcomes of police arbitration are nearly
identical when limiting analysis to the Bloomberg database, the
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services database, or the combined
database. That is to say, when I analyzed the 512 opinions derived from
the Bloomberg database exclusively, the 112 opinions derived from the
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services exclusively, or the 624
opinions from the combined database, the overall outcomes—including
the types of alleged misconduct, the rate of reversals, and the
justifications for reversals—are substantially similar in the aggregate.
This provides some confidence that the overall dataset is potentially
representative of the predictable outcomes of police arbitration as
currently employed in most American jurisdictions.
Once I collected and sorted this dataset, I developed relevant
coding variables and definitions. In order to do this in a manner
consistent with prior studies of police policies,183 I conducted a
preliminary examination of the dataset and surveyed the existing
181. Rushin, supra note 25, at 570–71 tbl.2 (showing the common features of arbitration
appeals procedures across the country).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Police Splits, 68
ALA. L. REV. 395, 423–24 (2016) (conducting a detailed coding of body camera policies from the
largest one hundred police departments); Joanna Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127
YALE L.J. 1, 19–25 (2017) (describing a similar methodology for coding cases to examine the effects
of qualified immunity); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1217 (2017)
(also coding police labor agreements in a similar manner to observe patterns across a dataset that
can inform theory); MARY D. FAN, CAMERA POWER: PROOF, POLICING, PRIVACY, AND AUDIOVISUAL
BIG DATA (2019) (conducting a more extensive coding of even more body camera policies from more
agencies); Rushin, supra note 25, at 566–70 (describing use of similar methodology); Stephen
Rushin & Atticus DeProspo, Interrogating Police Officers, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 662–68
(2019) (similarly describing this type of methodology).
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literature discussed in Part II. Ultimately, after this iterative process,
I settled on eighteen variables that help illustrate the outcomes of
arbitration in police disciplinary cases. These variables fall into three
general groups. First, I included six variables that summarized the
general case characteristics and outcome, including basic information
like the name of the arbitrator, a short summary of the alleged offense,
the prevailing party in the arbitration proceeding, the disciplinary
sentence before arbitration, the disciplinary sentence after arbitration,
and the final disciplinary sentence expressed as a percentage of the
original disciplinary sentence. Second, I included nine variables
designed to categorize the wide range of alleged misconduct found in
the dataset. After a preliminary review of the dataset, I sorted the cases
into the most common types of misconduct, including dishonesty,
domestic offenses, uses of force or incidents of violence, failures by
officers to act, racist or homophobic remarks, sexual impropriety,
substance abuse, traffic violations, and other general technical
violations. Finally, I added an additional three variables designed to
document the most common justifications for arbitrators revising or
overturning disciplinary action against officers: procedural,
proportionality, and evidentiary justifications.
Coding this dataset across these eighteen variables resulted in
11,232 coding decisions. It is important to recognize that not every case
fit neatly into these coding variable definitions. In a small number of
cases, I had to exercise my own judgment in categorizing the type of
offense or the arbitrator’s justification for reducing or overturning
discipline. And in some cases, alleged offenses fit into multiple
categories, as did the arbitrator’s justification for reversals or
reductions in discipline. The next Part describes the results of
this analysis.
IV. OUTCOMES OF POLICE ARBITRATION
Arbitrators overturned or reduced roughly half of all disciplinary
penalties issued by police chiefs, sheriffs, and city leaders. This finding
is roughly consistent with prior examinations of police arbitration
outcomes by Adams184 and Collins.185 These findings are also potentially
consistent with those by Kelly, Lowery, and Rich.186 Even though Kelly,
Lowery, and Rich found that a mere 24% of all officers terminated
184. Adams, supra note 112, at 140 (finding in his analysis that a similar rate—46.7%—of
discharges were overturned via arbitration).
185. Collins, supra note 136 (finding that roughly half of disciplinary cases in Minnesota
resulted in reversals or reductions).
186. See Kelly et al., supra note 31.
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across thirty-seven agencies were rehired on appeal, their dataset
seemingly included both cases that advanced to arbitration and those
that did not (for example, cases where the union or aggrieved officer
chose not to appeal discipline, or cases where the union reached a
settlement agreement with management prior to arbitration).187 This
study, by contrast, focuses exclusively on disciplinary appeals that
advance to arbitration. It seems plausible that unions or aggrieved
officers may choose not to challenge some disciplinary sanctions or
terminations because of the low probability of success on appeal. This
could skew the resulting arbitration outcomes as described in more
detail in Part V.
Overall, in the context of the present dataset, arbitrators
reduced the length of the average suspension by about half. And in
roughly half of all cases of terminations, arbitrators ordered the officer
rehired on appeal. Further, arbitrators most commonly cited
proportionality concerns in reducing or overturning discipline. It was
comparatively rarer—although not uncommon—for arbitrators to
upend disciplinary sanctions because of disagreements with the factual
findings or concerns about the procedural defects in the earlier
investigation or adjudication of wrongdoing. The sections that follow
describe the types of misconduct that advanced to arbitration on appeal,
the rates of reversals and reductions of discipline, and the justifications
given by arbitrators in altering disciplinary penalties.
A. Types of Misconduct Appealed to Arbitration
The types of misconduct that progressed on appeal to arbitration
vary widely. Some of this misconduct is serious and involves significant
harm to other people in a manner rarely seen in other professions.
Other misconduct is relatively minor and similar to the kind of
misconduct we might expect to find in any workplace. Table 1
summarizes the distribution of offenses that advanced to arbitration
on appeal.188

187. See id.
188. It is also important to recognize that this does not represent a complete picture of the
world of police misconduct generally. Presumably, there are some types of misconduct that officers
choose to not appeal—perhaps because they realize their chances of success are relatively low, or
in more minor cases, because they decided to accept the initial punishment without further appeal.
Thus, it is important to understand what this data can and cannot tell us. It is worth noting that
some incidents fell into multiple categories. Thus, the numbers in Table 1 will add up to more
than 624.

2021]

POLICE ARBITRATION

1055

these included acts of violence against unarmed civilians, 194 fellow
officers,195 children,196 individuals with physical disabilities,197
individuals experiencing mental health crises,198 animals,199 and
numerous individuals already in officer custody or in handcuffs.200
In nearly a quarter of the cases, supervisors allege officers
engaged in professional dishonesty, including falsified police reports,201
lack of candor during investigations,202 withholding information in

194. See, e.g., –, Union v. Emp., 4654834-AAA, 2018 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4654834 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n Oct. 16, 2018) (Zeiser, Arb.) (redacted decision) (case involving officer who killed a burglary
suspect, faced criminal charges for the killing, and was terminated by his department, only to be
ordered rehired with back pay by an arbitrator on appeal).
195. See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 93, FCMS Case No. 10/60154,
130 BNA LA (BL) 714, 719, 724 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. May 21, 2012) (McReynolds,
Arb.) (upholding the termination of an officer who choked a fellow officer until she
lost consciousness).
196. See, e.g., Police Command Officers Union v. Emp., 149904-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
149904 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 26, 2011) (Ryan, Arb.) (upholding the termination of an officer who,
among other offenses, unjustifiably used force against a juvenile); City of Columbus v. Fraternal
Ord. of Police, Cap. City Lodge 9, Grievance No. 24-2016, 138 BNA LA (BL) 158, 160, 164 (June 3,
2017) (Goldberg, Arb.) (overturning three-day suspension for officer who accidentally shot a child).
197. See, e.g., City of Slayton v. Slayton Police Officers Ass’n, 138 BNA LA (BL) 1917, 1926–
27 (Oct. 1, 2018) (Latsch, Arb.) (officer allegedly forcibly and unnecessarily removed a paraplegic
driver from his car, unlawfully arrested him, and used excessive force).
198. See, e.g., IBPO Loc. – v. Emp., 148703-AAA, 2012 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148703 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n Mar. 5, 2012) (Altman, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing the penalty against an officer who
mishandled a situation, resulting in injuries, with a person experiencing a mental health crisis).
199. See, e.g., Ramsey Cnty. v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., BMS Case No. 16-PA-0957, 2016 WL
6610300, at *1, *3 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Oct. 29, 2016) (Vernon, Arb.) (ordering the
rehiring, with limitations, of an officer who severely beat his dog while drunk, resulting in animal
cruelty charges against him).
200. See, e.g., Metro. Council v. Teamsters Loc. 320, BMS Case No. 14-PA-1085, 2015 WL
4931085, at *1–2 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. May 25, 2015) (Jacobs, Arb.) (involving an
officer who allegedly punched a person who was handcuffed and in custody); City of Blue Island v.
Ill. Fed’n of Police, FCMS Case No. 16-52757, 137 BNA LA (BL) 845, 846–48 (Fed. Mediation &
Conciliation Serv. Apr. 10, 2017) (Dichter, Arb.) (arbitrator reducing thirty-day suspension to twoday suspension for striking a handcuffed suspect).
201. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs. Deputy Loc. 212 v. Cnty. of Isanti, BMS Case No. 17-PA0050 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Sept. 6, 2017) (Neigh, Arb.), https://mn.gov/
bms/documents/BMS/130696-20170906-Isanti.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4G5J-JPSQ]
(upholding
termination for falsifying a report, making hostile/harassing calls to another officer, and failing to
act appropriately in vehicle chase); United Pub. Serv. Emps. Union/COPS Loc. – v. Emp., 4642861AAA, 2018 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4642861 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 9, 2018) (Williamson, Jr., Arb.)
(redacted decision) (upholding termination for multiple falsified accident reports).
202. See, e.g., Emp. v. Individual Grievant Appellant, 148074-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
148074 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Aug. 4, 2013) (Bennett, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing indefinite
suspension to five-day suspension in case involving alleged lack of candor by officer).
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investigations,203 and falsifying time sheets. 204 In several of these cases,
employers sought termination of the officer because of a belief that the
officer’s dishonesty would require inclusion on a Brady list,205 thereby
limiting the officer’s ability to serve as an effective witness in a future
criminal trial.206
While these large numbers of crimes of violence and dishonesty
are illuminating, it is important to recognize that the largest segment
of cases (54.5%) involves technical violations of departmental policy.
These can range from relatively serious violations of departmental
policy, like conduct unbecoming of an officer207 and insubordination,208
to relatively minor offenses, like violations of uniform dress code,209

203. See, e.g., City of Sandy v. Sandy Police Ass’n, 129 BNA LA (BL) 669, 672, 680 (Aug. 12,
2011) (Calhoun, Arb.) (ordering officer rehired where officer allegedly withheld information from
prosecution for a friend).
204. See, e.g., Emp. v. Officers Ass’n, 161910-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 161910 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n June 11, 2010) (McDonald, Arb.) (redacted decision) (termination downgraded to a ninetyday suspension for providing false information about overtime worked).
205. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (holding that prosecutors must disclose
material evidence that may be favorable to a criminal defendant, which can include an officer’s
prior history of dishonesty or misconduct); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)
(concluding that Brady requires the prosecution to turn over evidence known to them). For a
detailed summary of how police disciplinary records interact with Brady requirements, see
Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle
Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 749–51, 762–79 (2015); see also Rachel
Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1360–79 (2018) (noting the kinds of
barriers that prevent access to officers’ records, which may shed light on their proclivity
towards dishonesty).
206. See, e.g., City of Lakeland v. W. Cent. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, FMCS Case No.
15114/00483, 135 BNA LA (BL) 8 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. June 29, 2015) (Sergent,
Arb.) (forcing police department to reassign officer to policing duties, despite inclusion on Brady
list and strong objection by department); Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Mahnomen, Case
No. 16-PA-0738 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Aug. 17, 2016) (Paull, Arb.), https://mn.gov/
bms/documents/BMS/126428-20160817-Mahnomen.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ8N-B3QJ] (arbitrator
reinstating officer with last chance agreement despite objection by county, which believed the
officer was impaired from testifying in the future because of inclusion on Brady list).
207. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. Police Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council,
Inc., FMCS Case No. 08/03136, 125 BNA LA (BL) 981 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Oct.
28, 2008) (Sellman, Arb.) (overturning suspension for intoxication and conduct unbecoming of
an officer).
208. See, e.g., City of Hous. Police Dep’t v. Sergeant R.T., AAA Case No. 70 390 00205 09, 2009
BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119556 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 20, 2009) (Moore, Arb.) (upholding ten-day
suspension for failure to act and insubordination).
209. See, e.g., – Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. City of –, 4661480-AAA, BNA LA Supp. (BL)
4661480 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Feb. 25, 2019) (Stokes, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding three-day
suspension for uniform violation and visibility of tattoos).
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scheduling disagreements,210 tardiness,211 and even one case involving
an officer bringing his new puppy to visit coworkers at the precinct
without authorization.212 And numerous cases involved officers making
offensive statements in public or on social media, including one officer
who, after getting called out for his offensive behavior, bragged online
that, “I can’t get fired ha ha.”213 That officer was fired by his chief, but
ultimately rehired by an arbitrator on appeal.214
A smaller, but still significant, percentage of the cases involved
domestic violence,215 traffic accidents,216 or substance abuse (most
notably, alcohol abuse).217 And at least sixteen cases involved officers
210. See, e.g., Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Borough, 161612-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
161612 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 2, 2010) (Skonier, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning ten-day
suspension related to scheduling disagreement).
211. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Police Union Loc. 6, FMCS Case No. 17/56138, 138
BNA LA (BL) 610 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Feb. 26, 2018) (Bonney, Arb.) (overturning
termination for repeated tardiness among other violations).
212. Wright State Univ. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., FMCS Case No.
15/01115-6, 135 BNA LA (BL) 1174 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Aug. 3, 2015)
(Goldberg, Arb.).
213. Police Dep’t v. Police Ass’n, 148178-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148178 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n Sept. 4, 2013) (Visco, Arb.) (redacted decision).
214. Id. (reducing the termination to a seven-day suspension from the date of the opinion).
215. In total, twenty-seven cases in the dataset involved both domestic disputes and the
alleged use of physical violence or show of physical force. See, e.g., Minneapolis Police Officers
Fed’n v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Dec. 30, 2009) (Reynolds, Arb.),
https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20091230-Mpls.pdf [https://per.ma.cc/WD3E-NGE9] (upholding
termination in case involving domestic violence and a restraining order); Minneapolis Police
Officers Fed’n v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. May 18, 2012) (Reynolds,
Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20120518.pdf [https://perma.cc/32VT-HQZS] (reducing
termination for case involving felony assault of spouse to a short suspension after the spouse
recanted claims); Emp. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. –, 149805-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 149805 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 20, 2011) (Talarico, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reinstating officer
without back pay who was accused of pulling spouse’s hair and hitting her in the head with the
butt of his gun); Emp. v. Combined L. Enf’t Ass’ns, 148668-AAA, 2012 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148668
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Feb. 17, 2012) (Hays, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding termination of officer
who drunkenly punched spouse multiple times in the face).
216. See, e.g., Individual Grievant v. Emp., 148628-AAA, 2012 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148628
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Jan. 21, 2012) (Molina, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding one-day suspension
for car accident while driving at unsafe speed); Emp. v. Union, 149841-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 149841 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Nov. 4, 2011) (Miller, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing a three-day
suspension to a one-day suspension for causing an accident via an illegal turn).
217. Many of these cases involved driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 3307, FMCS Case No. 13/00842-8,
133 BNA LA (BL) 419 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Jan. 3, 2014) (Nicholas, Arb.)
(upholding a reduction in responsibilities after agent caught allegedly driving under the influence
of alcohol); Police Officers’ Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation
Servs. Nov. 8, 2014) (Fogelberg, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20141108-Minneapolis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LPA-WBAP] (reducing a thirty-two day suspension to a ten-day suspension in
case involving officer caught allegedly driving under the influence). Some involve cases where
alcohol appears to be a contributing factor to other types of misconduct, like public intoxication or
unbecoming conduct. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. Police Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab.
Council, Inc., FMCS Case No. 08/03136, 125 BNA LA (BL) 981 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation
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using racist or homophobic slurs,218 including multiple officers accused
of using the n-word219 and several who posted offensive or inappropriate
comments on their social media accounts.220
The distribution of misconduct listed in Table 1 is significant, in
part because it provides insight into the wide range of misconduct
allegedly committed by police officers across the country. On the one
hand, some of the alleged misconduct handled by the police disciplinary
system looks fairly similar to the kinds of mistakes or wrongdoing we
would expect to find in any professional setting. Just like any other
public servant, some police officers are punished for arriving late to
work,221 sleeping on the job,222 and failing to properly file paperwork or
follow day-to-day procedures.223
On the other hand, these data also demonstrate the unique
nature of professional misconduct in policing relative to other fields.
Unlike most other public servants, sworn law enforcement officers
Serv. Oct. 28, 2008) (Sellman, Arb.) (in case where officer allegedly got into a fight while
intoxicated, overturning suspension because the disciplinary action was not commenced within
the mandatory time requirements). Other cases involve other types of drugs or unlawful
substances. See, e.g., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fed. Protective Serv.
v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 505, 130 BNA LA (BL) 481 (May 21, 2012) (Gentile, Arb.)
(upholding termination for an officer testing positive for methamphetamine); Summit Cnty. Ohio
Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., No. 2013-30, 133 BNA LA (BL)
546 (May 16, 2014) (Feldman, Arb.) (thirty-day suspension reduced to ten-day suspension in case
involving marijuana use).
218. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Patrolmen’s Union, Local –, 148474-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp.
(BL) 148474 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 26, 2013) (Litton, Arb.) (redacted decision) (involving an officer
who made multiple racist comments and social media posts including racial slurs); Police Ass’n v.
Emp., 205234-AAA, 2016 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 205234 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Nov. 27, 2016) (Lurie, Arb.)
(redacted decision) (cutting a ten-day suspension in half for an officer who used racist slurs when
talking to a home inspector, including using the word “wetb[*]ck”).
219. See, e.g., City of –, Conn. v. – Police Union, 4664750-AAA, 2019 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
4664750 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 10, 2019) (Neumeier, Arb.) (redacted decision) (ordering the rehiring
of an officer who operated a vehicle under the influence, used the n-word multiple times, and
threatened officers); Emp. (Tex.) v. Tex. Mun. Police Ass’n, 200576-AAA, 136 BNA LA (BL) 1467
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 22, 2016) (Jennings, Arb.) (redacted decision) (downgrading termination to a
five-day suspension after officer failed to respond to another officer’s use of “racially insensitive”
remarks, including use of the n-word and other racist comments).
220. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 166027-AAA, 2015 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 166027
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Jan. 9, 2015) (Cohen, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding three-day suspension
for officer who made inappropriate comments on social media).
221. See, e.g., Emp. v. Individual Grievant, 148334-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148334
(Am. Arb. Ass’n May 7, 2013) (Barnard, Arb.) (redacted decision) (decreasing a five-day suspension
to a three-day suspension for arriving late to work and failing to notify supervisor).
222. See, e.g., Teamsters, Loc. Union No. 637 v. Licking Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., FMCS No. 05051703576-8, 2006 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 117664 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Jan. 10, 2006)
(Goldberg, Arb.) (upholding termination of officer for sleeping on the job).
223. See, e.g., City of W. Carrollton v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, FMCS No.
13/01895, 132 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 960 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Oct. 24, 2013) (Lalka,
Arb.) (upholding termination for repeated failure to submit paperwork as required by performance
improvement plan).
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includes fifty-six officers that got their jobs back on appeal despite
accusations of significant dishonesty,224 including a Minnesota officer
accused of copying a judge’s signature on a warrant application225 and
a California officer allegedly caught by his partner planting drug
evidence on a suspect.226
Another forty-seven officers accused of unjustified violence were
ordered rehired, including an officer who shot and killed an unarmed
man in Oakland, California,227 multiple officers who allegedly pointed
their guns at fellow officers,228 and multiple officers charged with crimes
of violence like assault.229 Also among the officers reinstated by
arbitrators were twenty-two accused of substance abuse,230 nine
accused of racist or homophobic comments,231 and nine accused of
sexual impropriety.232 When arbitrators forced communities to rehire
previously fired officers, the revised punishments varied widely; some
officers received full back pay and no punishment,233 while other officers
224. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 150813-AAA, 2009 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 150813
(Am. Arb. Ass’n June 1, 2009) (Humphries, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning termination of
officer for alleged false statements and ordering officer rehired with back pay).
225. Benton Cnty. v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., BMS Case No. 18-PA-0058 (Minn. Bureau of
Mediation Servs. Oct. 12, 2018) (Miller, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/23310720181012-Benton.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7PV-TRLZ].
226. Cnty. of Stanislaus v. Stanislaus Sworn Deputies Ass’n, Loc. 315, CSMCS Case No. ARB
09-0478, 128 BN LNA Supp. (BL) 592 (Cal. State Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Oct. 7, 2010)
(Pool, Arb.).
227. City of Oakland v. Oakland Police Officers’ Ass’n, CSMCS Case No. 09-0707, 128 BNA
LNA Supp. (BL) 1217 (Cal. State Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Mar. 2, 2011) (Gaba, Arb.).
228. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Washington, BMS Case No. 05-PA-599
(Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs., Apr. 26, 2006) (Befort, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/
BMS/155235-Arbitration%20Awards.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKS8-225X] (reducing termination to
thirty-day suspension); Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Emp., 161709-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
161709 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Feb. 8, 2010) (Skonier, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing termination to
ten-day suspension).
229. See, e.g., Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge – v. Emp., 150395-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
150395 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Jan. 21, 2011) (Long, Arb.) (redacted decision) (grievant charged with
simple assault, aggravated assault, and harassment); –, Union v. Emp., 4654834-AAA, 2018 BNA
LA Supp. (BL) 4654834 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 16, 2018) (Zeiser, Arb.) (redacted decision) (officer
accused of unjustifiably killing burglary suspect and also faced criminal charges).
230. See, e.g., Police Officers Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of
Mediation Servs. Dec. 5, 2007) (Befort, Arb.) (reducing termination involving alcohol use and
driving under the influence to a five-day suspension).
231. See, e.g., Police Ass’n v. Emp., 200981-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 200981 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n June 19, 2017) (Wood, Arb.) (redacted decision) (offenses included racial harassment,
mocking an accent, racist statements, and slurs; termination reduced to five-day suspension).
232. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police, FOP Lodge –, 199114-AAA, 2015 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 199114
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Sept. 28, 2015) (Colflesh, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reinstating officer without back
pay; officer accused of accessing pornography at work eighty-three times and arranging sexual
encounters at work).
233. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 149508-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 149508
(Am. Arb. Ass’n May 24, 2011) (Humphries, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning termination and
ordering reinstatement with back pay).
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the discipline was time limited, either because the employer took too
long to complete its investigation or the complainant made their
allegation too long after the alleged wrongdoing.236 In other cases,
arbitrators cited lack of notice,237 improper consideration of prior
disciplinary history in violation of a collective bargaining agreement or
state law,238 or other more complicated procedural objections.239
In a somewhat larger number of cases, arbitrators cited a
disagreement with the strength of the evidence presented at the
hearing. Often, these cases involved the arbitrator simply disagreeing
with the employer’s determination that sufficient evidence existed to
prove a case by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and
convincing evidence.240
But the most common justification for overturning or reducing
disciplinary action was a determination that the punishment was
disproportionate. In some cases, arbitrators found that a punishment
was disproportionate because it failed to properly consider mitigating
factors in an officer’s record.241 In other cases, arbitrators found that a
punishment was disproportionate to the punishments given to other
similarly situated officers in the same department who committed the
same type of misconduct in the past.242 And in many cases, the

236. See, e.g., El Paso Police Dep’t v. Police Officer Michael Velez, AAA No. 70 390 00813 04,
2006 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 117630 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 18, 2006) (Allen, Jr., Arb.) (justifying
reduction of six-day penalty to no punishment because notice was not served on the officer within
the appropriate time limit).
237. See, e.g., Police Ass’n v. Emp., 150953-AAA, 2014 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 150593 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n Jan. 17, 2014) (Simpkins, Arb.) (redacted decision) (“Lack of notice is not an excuse for
prohibited conduct but it can be, as it is here, a bar to the assessment of discipline and its effect.”).
238. See, e.g., Emp. v. Pro. L. Enf’t Ass’n, 4633833-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4633833
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 4, 2017) (Milinski, Arb.) (redacted decision) (citing improper consideration of
disciplinary history); Dewitt Charter Twp. v. Police Officers Lab. Council, Grievance POLC No.
18-001, 139 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 1356, 1362 (Jan. 21, 2019) (McDonald, Arb.) (finding that
department violated collective bargaining agreement by “not removing a reference to
the Grievant’s May 2016 discipline from the Grievant’s backdated November 28, 2016
written reprimand”).
239. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Springfield Police Officers Ass’n, Lodge 22, FMCS Case No.
150826-57265-8, 2016 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4660933 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. May 10,
2016) (Fowler, Arb.) (justifying overturning of punishment because of lack of exact rule on point).
240. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Individual Grievant, 161551-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
161551 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 23, 2010) (Fragnoli, Arb.) (redacted decision) (determining that,
despite evidence that an email violating departmental policy originated from an officer’s home IP
address, this was insufficient on a preponderance of the evidence standard to prove that she
sent it).
241. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Steele Cnty., BMS Case No. 06-PA-620 (Minn.
Bureau of Mediation Servs., Oct. 26, 2006) (Befort, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/MatejcekSteele-County-Decision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C66W-MRAJ] (focusing primarily on mitigating
circumstances reducing written reprimand to oral reprimand).
242. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Youngstown Police Ass’n/The Ohio Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Ass’n, 134 BNA LA (BL) 1644, 1654 (May 20, 2015) (Bell, Arb.) (reducing penalty to
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arbitrator simply exercised her independent judgment in concluding
that the penalty given by the police chief or city official was
disproportionate relative to the offense committed.243 An example from
Fairfield County, Ohio, illustrates how arbitrators sometimes exercise
their discretion to reduce officer penalties out of a concern for
proportionality. In that case, an officer was accused of unnecessarily
and unjustifiably choking a man in custody.244 The events were
videotaped, and there did not appear to be any disagreement about the
facts. The arbitrator ultimately agreed that the officer’s conduct was
“inappropriate and worthy of discipline,”245 but concluded that “the
penalty of discharge was too excessive” given the officer’s work history
and commendations.246
Similarly, in another Ohio case, an arbitrator largely agreed
with the factual determinations reached by the police department in
terminating an officer for “ ‘sexting’ former and current victims of
crimes that that he had investigated” while on duty, failing to appear
for a disciplinary interview, and moonlighting as a security guard at a
liquor store without departmental approval.247 There was little factual
debate. As the arbitrator noted, the officer “admitted to and accepted
full responsibility for [his] repeated egregious wrongdoing,” which was
not “isolated” but rather “continuous for a period of months.” 248 As the
arbitrator bluntly put it, there was a “mountain of misconduct
demanding harsh discipline.”249 Ultimately, though, the arbitrator
concluded that some mitigating factors, including the officer’s
acceptance of responsibility and his marital problems, warranted a
lesser punishment.250 Thus, despite the arbitrator agreeing that the
officer’s conduct was “wrongful and reprehensible,” he ordered
him rehired.251
In these cases, and dozens of others like them, arbitrators
arguably substituted the judgment of police chiefs, sheriffs, and city
match that of a prior officer at the department who, in judgment of arbitrator, committed factually
similar wrongdoing).
243. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Ass’n, 200916-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 200916 (Am. Arb.
Ass’n May 18, 2017) (Stein, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing six-day suspension to
nondisciplinary counseling based on concerns about excessive punishment).
244. Fairfield Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, FMCS Case No. 07/01667, 124
BNA LA (BL) 1066 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Nov. 5, 2007) (Chattman, Arb.).
245. Id. at 1072.
246. Id. at 1073.
247. Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Emp., 149974-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 149974 (Am.
Arb. Ass’n Nov. 7, 2013) (Spring, Arb.) (redacted decision).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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leaders with their own. Critics may argue that this could hamper the
ability of these more democratically accountable actors to control
departments and promote organizational reform, as discussed more in
the next Part.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
The findings from this Article have important implications for
the literature on police accountability and reform. These findings may
be consistent with claims by police unions that arbitration serves an
important role in correcting arbitrary and unpredictable punishment
by management. The results may also be a reminder that not all
disciplinary appeals necessarily proceed to arbitration. Prior
examinations have found that management and unions in some cities
frequently settle disciplinary appeals before they proceed to
arbitration.252 For example, an examination by William Bender and
David Gambacorta in the Philadelphia Inquirer found that around 75
out of 169 police disciplinary cases between 2011 and 2019 in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were settled before they proceeded to
arbitration.253 This may mean that the cases that actually proceed to
arbitration in communities like Philadelphia are not a representative
sample of all disciplinary cases. Instead, the disciplinary cases that
proceed to arbitration may be the ones where the outcome of the appeal
is most uncertain—perhaps because of genuine disagreements about
management’s adherence to organizational precedent for discipline,
procedural irregularities, or questionable factual findings. Additionally,
anecdotal evidence suggests that police unions sometimes employ more
experienced advocates during arbitration procedures, perhaps
contributing to their high rates of success.254 As one Fraternal Order of
Police leader joked, lawyers for the police unions are often so much more
experienced than their government counterparts that “[i]t’s like the
L.A. Lakers or the 76ers going up against a grade school team. . . . I
mean, it’s not that hard.”255 This hypothesis—that the frequency of
reversals of police discipline via arbitration is the result of inadequate
investment by management in internal investigations—is worthy of
additional, serious scholarly inquiry. All of this means that we should
view the data from this study with caution before drawing sweeping
252. Bender & Gambacorta, supra note 53 (showing in the table, labeled “The Philadelphia
Police Misconduct Database,” all of the cases between 2011 and 2019 and their outcomes; further
showing that 75 of the 169 cases listed in this table resulted in a settlement).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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conclusions about the use of arbitration in police disciplinary cases
more generally. The high rates of union success may be an outgrowth
of case selection and other contextual facts unique to the litigation of
appeals in local governments.
Nevertheless, the findings from this Article may also be
consistent with prior criticisms of arbitration in policing. For one thing,
the evidence from this study is consistent with the hypothesis that the
use of arbitration on appeal creates incentives for arbitrators to
consistently reduce disciplinary actions in order to increase their
probability of being selected in future cases. The high frequency of
arbitrators overturning or reducing discipline also suggests that
arbitration may be a barrier to reform efforts. In response, this Part
concludes by considering ways that communities could amend police
disciplinary procedures so as to better balance officer due process rights
with the public’s interest in officer accountability. In doing so, this
Article draws on recent legislative changes in Minnesota and Oregon as
possible blueprints for reform in other jurisdictions.
A. Arbitration and Compromise
The results of this study are potentially consistent with the
scholarly hypothesis that arbitration in police disciplinary appeals may
consistently result in compromise that can impede accountability
efforts.256 One possible explanation is that the methodology that many
communities use to select arbitrators may incentivize compromise.257
Remember, prior research has found that a majority of law enforcement
agencies use one of two methods to select arbitrators in disciplinary
appeals—they use either an alternate strike method, where each side
can strike names in alternating order from a pool of potential
arbitrators until one name remains, or they name arbitrators in their
labor agreements.258 Either selection method may incentivize rational
arbitrators to reach compromise results in the aggregate in order to
increase their chances of being selected as arbitrators for future cases.

256. After conducting case studies of the arbitration processes in Chicago and Houston,
Professor Mark Iris concluded that “arbitration decisions were often based on something other
than the merits of the parties’ evidence or strength of case presentation.” Iris, supra note 55,
at 137.
257. Rushin, supra note 25, at 566 (“Such a selection process may contribute to arbitrator
decisions that split the difference between supervisor and union demands, since siding too
frequently with one side or the other might endanger an arbitrator’s selection in future cases
through an alternate strike system.”).
258. Id. at 574–75 (“Most of these departments fall into two different categories: First, a
handful of agencies explicitly stipulate an acceptable panel of arbitrators in their union
contract. . . . Second, another group of agencies establish alternative striking procedures.”).
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As Professor Iris previously theorized, because of the use of these
arbitrator selection methods, the decision about “who will serve as an
arbitrator depends upon the willingness of both parties to a
dispute . . . to accept that individual as an arbitrator.”259 Arbitrators
who side with management or the union too often may find themselves
stricken from the pool of potential arbitrators in future cases, or they
may find their names taken out of future labor contracts. Because of
this, Professor Iris concludes, “it is in the self-interest of the individual
arbitrators to project an image of impartiality.”260 As repeat players who
are concerned about being selected for future cases, arbitrators may
often make the rational choice to compromise.261
In other fields, an arbitrator’s tendency towards compromise
may not be a problem, particularly when it allows for the resolution of
matters like financial or contractual disputes between sophisticated
parties.262 But in the world of police accountability, compromise can
have serious public policy implications. Compromise can result in unfit
or dangerous officers terminated for acts of violence or dishonesty being
forced back onto a police force where they are prone to commit future
acts of wrongdoing.
Over the years in San Antonio, Texas, for example, arbitrators
have repeatedly ordered the rehiring of officers that have allegedly
committed egregious misconduct, only to have those same officers
engage in similar misconduct after rehiring. For example, in 2009, a
San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) officer stood accused of
entering a suspect’s home without a warrant and using excessive force

259. Iris, supra note 38, at 240.
260. Id.
261. To be clear, this is just a theory. It is not intended to suggest bad faith on the part of any
individual arbitrator. For one thing, this kind of incentive may operate unconsciously. And even if
arbitrators are acting in good faith within the system as currently established, this does not mean
that the system as a whole serves the public interest. A system of well-intended individuals acting
in good faith may still produce undesirable results.
262. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 452 (2010) (noting that among the
theories about why sophisticated parties in business relationships may choose arbitration over
litigation to resolve disputes is that arbitration “may enhance the ability of parties to have their
disputes resolved using trade rules” and “arbitration may enable the parties to better preserve
their relationship”); Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap
“Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 236 (“In arbitration clause analysis, the
argument is that sophisticated businesspeople, individually or on behalf of a commercial entity,
can protect themselves from an onerous arbitration clause, while an unsophisticated person
cannot.”). But cf. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”:
Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573, 574 (2001)
(finding a lack of evidence of compromise in arbitration awards in other contexts).
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in making an arrest.263 Days later, a man arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol accused the officer of challenging him to a fight for
the opportunity to be released from his custody.264 Based on these
incidents, the SAPD fired the officer, only to see an arbitrator reduce
the termination to two thirty-day suspensions and a last chance
agreement.265 Then, after rejoining the force, the same officer’s squad
car camera caught him engaging in strikingly similar misconduct when
he challenged yet another man to a fist fight for the chance to be
released from his custody.266 Again, the SAPD attempted to fire the
officer, and again an arbitrator overturned the firing, settling instead
on a forty-five-day suspension.267
Similarly, the SAPD fired another officer in 2016 for “trying to
give a homeless man a sandwich filled with dog feces.” 268 But an
arbitrator ordered that officer rehired on appeal.269 Shortly after
rehiring, though, the police department again attempted to fire that
officer, alleging that he committed yet another transgression involving
excrement.270 This pattern is repeated across the country. When

263. Tim Gerber, SAPD Officer Appeals Termination, Wins Job Back Through Arbitration,
KSAT (Apr. 27, 2017, 9:47 PM), https://www.ksat.com/news/2017/04/28/sapd-officer-appealstermination-wins-job-back-through-arbitration [https://perma.cc/BK44-75SC].
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Michael Barajas, San Antonio Cop Arrests, Berates and Threatens to Fight Man for Being
“Disrespectful,” SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (June 9, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.sacurrent.com/thedaily/archives/2016/06/09/san-antonio-cop-arrests-berates-and-threatens-to-fight-man-for-beingdisrespectful [https://perma.cc/4NBQ-7Z3A].
267. Gerber, supra note 263; see also City of San Antonio v. Officer Matthew Belver, No.
400169 (Mar. 1, 2017) (Gomez, Arb.), https://www.scribd.com/document/346931719/SAPD-OfficerMatthew-Belver-arbitration-hearing-document-pdf [https://perma.cc/F5BD-VCU3].
268. Sanford Nowlin, Report: Two-Thirds of Fired San Antonio Cops Won Their Jobs Back in
Arbitration, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (Jan. 7, 2020, 12:45 PM), https://www.sacurrent.com/thedaily/archives/2020/01/07/report-two-thirds-of-fired-san-antonio-cops-won-their-jobs-back-inarbitration [https://perma.cc/45SW-LARE].
269. Sanford Nowlin, San Antonio Officer Who Handed Feces Sandwich to Homeless Man Wins
His Termination Appeal, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:13 PM),
https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2019/03/25/san-antonio-officer-who-handed-fecessandwich-to-homeless-man-wins-his-termination-appeal [https://perma.cc/7DCX-UDLL].
270. Emilie Eaton, SAPD: Fired Cop Involved in Second Feces Prank, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/SAPD-Fired-cop-involved-in-second-fecesprank-10886729.php (last updated Jan. 26, 2017, 9:04 PM) [https://perma.cc/TZ6N-9MLX]
(describing the initial firing decision); Dillon Collier, David Raziq & Joshua Saunders, SAPD
Officer Who Gave Homeless Man a Feces Sandwich Trying to Win Back Job for a Second Time,
KSAT, https://www.ksat.com/news/defenders/2020/01/03/sapd-officer-who-gave-homeless-man-afeces-sandwich-trying-to-win-back-job-for-a-second-time (last updated Jan. 11, 2020, 8:45 AM)
[https://perma.cc/DR5F-6ZD4] (detailing the officer’s appeal); Emilie Eaton, Fired SAPD Officer
Accused in Feces Sandwich Prank Loses Second Bid to Get His Job Back, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS (June 19, 2020), https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Fired-SAPD-officeraccused-in-feces-sandwich-15353640.php [https://perma.cc/9C9X-X7YH] (explaining that the
second appeal was unsuccessful and that the officer was finally terminated).

1068

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4:1023

compromise on appeal forces police departments to employ dangerous
or unfit officers, these officers put the public at risk.
While the evidence from this study is consistent with the
hypothesis that arbitration incentivizes compromise in police discipline
cases, it falls short of proving causation. This study cannot answer one
of the most challenging questions facing critics of police arbitration:
How often should arbitrators overturn or reduce discipline on appeal?
As prior research has observed, “[t]here is no easy answer to this
question” and “appellate success ought to vary by department” based on
the unique characteristics of each agency and whether a given agency
is particularly prone to “arbitrary, excessive, or unreasonable
disciplinary decisions.”271 But what is clear from this study is that the
frequency of appellate success for police disciplinary appeals greatly
outpaces the rate of success of litigants in front of other appellate
bodies. As one recent study found, between July 2017 and June 2018
across all U.S. federal courts of appeals, only 6.6% of criminal appeals,
and 7.5% of administrative agency appeals, resulted in reversal.272 In
total, the annual rate of successful appeals filed in federal courts
hovered between 6.9% and 9.6% between 2013 and 2018.273 And
according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the rate of appellate
success in state criminal courts sat around 12% in 2010.274 These figures
stand in stark contrast to the 52% rate of success for police disciplinary
appeals observed in this study.
Given the standard of review on appeal in police disciplinary
cases,275 perhaps it is unsurprising that arbitrators so frequently reduce
or reverse discipline. Indeed, appellate courts might overturn trial
courts more often if given more expansive responsibility to review
factual, legal, and sentencing decisions made by juries and trial courts.
As it stands, though, appellate courts are almost always given a
significantly narrower standard of review than arbitrators in police
disciplinary appeals cases.276 The unpredictable and sometimes
271. Rushin, supra note 25, at 581.
272. Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lower Courts: An Experimental
Study to Explore Affirmation Bias, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1035, 1037 (2019).
273. Id. at 1038.
274. Id. at 1039 (citing Nicole L. Waters, Anne Gallegos, James Green & Martha Roszi,
Criminal Appeals in State Courts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS 1 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB9W-KUEU]).
275. Rushin, supra note 25, at 576–78.
276. Federal appellate courts in the United States may sometimes review “the factual findings
made by the trial court or agency, but generally may overturn a decision on factual grounds only
if the findings were ‘clearly erroneous’ ” or if the trial court made a procedural error. Appellate
Courts and Cases – Journalist’s Guide, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
appellate-courts-and-cases-journalists-guide (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/39Q4CPQT]. Appellate courts in both the criminal and civil justice systems may remedy incorrect
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arbitrary nature of some departments’ internal disciplinary systems
may necessitate and justify a higher rate of reversal, relative to the
American justice system. As explained in the next Section, though, this
raises even more challenging normative questions about the best way
to balance democratic accountability and due process rights in police
disciplinary appeals.
B. Democratic Accountability and Organizational Change
The results of this study raise tough questions about democratic
accountability and the appropriate role of appeals in police disciplinary
cases. Police unions may understandably argue that appeals to an
arbitrator are an important due process protection to prevent unjust
punishment and retaliation. Appellate review may also force
departments to provide adequate procedural protections during
internal investigations. And in some cases, it seems that arbitration on
appeal serves this exact function. For example, in 2017 an arbitrator
overturned the termination of a police officer in Detroit because the
employer failed to give the officer a chance to respond to the allegations
against him before termination, something the arbitrator found
“antithetical to the whole notion of due process.” 277 Such corrections of
procedural failures by an employer seem to align with the purposes of
virtually all appellate systems of review.
But in other cases in the dataset, arbitrators do not merely
correct procedural due process errors. Instead, the data indicate that
arbitrators may arguably supplant the judgment of city leaders and
police chiefs with their own judgments on matters of facts and
proportionality. Consider, for example, a case from Texas involving an
officer appealing his termination for use of threats, profanity, and a
homophobic slur during an arrest.278 In that case, a bystander video
recorded the officer on top of a handcuffed man yelling, “Move and die.
Move and f[*]cking die. F[*]cking move again. F[*]cking move again.”279
applications of law but ordinarily do not replace the judgment of lower courts or juries on matters
of fact or the appropriate punishment, so long as the punishment is within the range specified by
statutes or sentencing guidelines. Id.
277. Detroit Transp. Serv. v. Police Officers Lab. Council, FMCS Case No. 1754575, 138 BNA
LA (BL) 209, at *215 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Dec. 22, 2017) (Obee, Arb.).
278. Officer A__ v. Emp., 148464-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148464 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July
24, 2013) (Fragnoli, Arb.) (redacted decision) (noting also that the stop started after the officer saw
the man allegedly make a “gesture indicating he might have been hiding something in his
waistband,” leading the officer to execute a stop; thereafter when the officer learned that the man
had several active warrants, he decided to execute an arrest).
279. When one of the suspect’s friends asked, “Are you f[*]cking serious?” the officer
responded, “Sit down. Sit down and shut the f[*]ck up.” As the exchange continued, both the
suspect and the officer referred to one another by a homophobic slur, and the officer told the
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The video also caught the officer referring to the handcuffed man by a
homophobic slur and challenging him to “move” or “blink wrong,”
seemingly in hopes of providing the officer with a justification to use
additional force.280 While the arbitrator in that case conceded that
“[t]here is no question that the Grievant’s conduct violated Department
policy,”281 he ultimately concluded that termination was
“disproportionate to the severity of the proven charges and
unwarranted in light of mitigating factors,” including the officer’s prior
service record and the fact that “this is a case about language
only.”282 That arbitrator ultimately reduced the officer’s sentence to a
fifteen-day suspension.283
As another example, take the case involving an Ohio officer who
allegedly forced his way into the home of his ex-girlfriend, punched
holes in her wall, and ultimately faced criminal charges for assaulting
her multiple times.284 The arbitrator in that case agreed that the
officer’s behavior constituted “conduct unbecoming [of] a police officer,”
which “warrants serious discipline.”285 But the arbitrator concluded
that termination was too harsh; he instead issued a ten-day suspension,
which he felt would be enough to “serve as a warning . . . to other
officers that such actions cannot be tolerated.”286
Indeed, arbitrators in this dataset reduced or overturned
punishments as unduly severe or disproportionate in cases of officers
that engaged in domestic violence,287 utilized excessive force,288 cheated
on exams,289 and exposed their genitals in public.290 In many of these
suspect, “Move so I can kick your ass. Move so I can f[*]ck you up. Give me a reason to f[*]ck you
up. Stupid ass. When the police are talking to you, you be quiet and shut up.” Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Emp. v. Union, 162289-AAA, 2014 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 162289 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 10,
2014) (Bethel, Arb.).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Emp. v. Command Officers Ass’n, 148269-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148269
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 25, 2013) (Wolkinson, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing termination to
suspension without back pay in case involving domestic violence, harassing and threatening a
private citizen, dishonesty, and violation of a last chance agreement in failing to see a therapist).
288. See, e.g., Individual Grievant v. Emp., 200818-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 200818
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 9, 2017) (Toedt, Arb.) (redacted decision) (finding punishment too severe in
case where officer allegedly grabbed man by the throat during traffic stop without justification).
289. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Ohio State Troopers Ass’n, 2009 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 118488
(May 11, 2009) (Feldman, Arb.) (citing “impeccable” record of officer to justify overturning
termination for cheating on exam).
290. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 161994-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 161994
(Am. Arb. Ass’n July 14, 2010) (Humphries, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning termination in
case involving officer urinating on duty in public and exposing his genitals).
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cases, the facts were mostly or completely undisputed. Often, there was
no debate about the procedural sufficiency of due process rights
afforded to the officer. And yet despite the fact that some of these
instances of officer misconduct might, as one arbitrator conceded,
“ ‘shock the conscience’ of most citizens,”291 arbitrators in the dataset
exercised their authority to lower the punishment out of a concern
for proportionality.
All this suggests that, as currently structured, the existing
process of police disciplinary appeals is not just an appellate system.
Instead, critics of this system may argue that it creates a shadow
disciplinary system that can largely disregard the decisions reached by
law enforcement agencies, city leaders, or civilian review boards.292
Scholars have expressed widely varying views about how to create an
internal disciplinary process for law enforcement officers that is
sufficiently responsive to democratic demands without risking officer
due process.293 Some scholars prefer to vest primary disciplinary
authority in the hands of police chiefs.294 Others believe that police
chiefs are too insulated from democratic accountability and argue
instead that communities should vest authority in groups like civilian
review boards that are more directly accountable and representative of
the public.295 But regardless of where scholars fall on this spectrum,
there seems to be broader agreement that “officer oversight should not
be divorced from community input.”296
The current approach to police discipline, though, creates a
procedural redundancy that may curtail the ability of many police
chiefs and community leaders to control their police departments. This
291. City of St. Paul v. St. Paul Police Fed’n 24 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Apr. 3,
2017) (Miller, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/129594-20170403-St.Paul.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N3SG-FBJ8]. In that case, the St. Paul Police Department terminated an officer in 2016
for engaging in excessive force and unnecessarily deploying a canine on an unarmed man, resulting
in multiple broken ribs, two collapsed lungs, and other injuries. The facts in the case were clear,
as the incident was caught on camera. As the arbitrator conceded in the opinion:
At first blush, the video of K-9 Falco grabbing and biting Mr. Baker, twisting Mr. Baker
around in a circle and then having the Grievant administer two consecutive kicks to
Mr. Baker’s torso and then waiting about 30 more seconds to administer another kick
to Mr. Baker’s torso would be proof alone to terminate.
Id. But the arbitrator ultimately elected to reduce the penalty to a thirty-day suspension based
largely on proportionality concerns.
292. Rushin, supra note 25, at 582–83 (using the example of Detroit to describe how cities that
have robust civilian review boards may nevertheless blunt their effectiveness with the use of
binding arbitration on appeal).
293. See generally Christopher E. Stone & Heather Ward, Democratic Policing: A Framework
for Action, 10 POLICING & SOC’Y 11, 12 (2000) (considering this question).
294. Id. at 17.
295. Id. at 17–18.
296. Rushin, supra note 25, at 589.
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could be problematic for many reasons. While unions may argue that
arbitrators are more detached or neutral, they may be disconnected
from the communities that the police department serves. And they may
lack the same institutional memory as police supervisors and may be
less responsive to community demands for increased accountability for
wrongdoing. They do not have to internalize or experience the costs they
place on communities by overturning discipline, for example in cases
where they force a department to rehire an officer who cannot testify at
trial because they are on a Brady list297 or an officer with a proven
proclivity for violence. And they may be disconnected from the
budgetary challenges they force on municipalities when they order
rehired an officer who cannot be safely deployed on the streets and must
therefore be hidden somewhere else in the organization.
Additionally, to the extent that communities demand reform
within a law enforcement agency, the current approach to police
disciplinary appeals used in many agencies could make transformative
change more difficult. Prior studies have shown that a small number of
officers are often responsible for a disproportionate amount of
misconduct.298 Further, recent empirical work suggests that the
presence of a small number of officers engaged in repeated misconduct
may increase the probability of misconduct among other officers around
them.299 This indicates that in order to reform a police department,
supervisors must be able to remove bad officers before their wrongdoing
can escalate and cause serious harm.300 But one of the possible effects
of the current police disciplinary appeals process is that, in some cases,
it lengthens considerably the time it takes to remove these unfit officers
from the force. Often, arbitrators demand that departments build
lengthy records of officer wrongdoing before they will uphold a
termination. And even when departments do build such a record, some

297. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of Brady lists and some
of the recent literature on the topic).
298. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., USE OF FORCE BY POLICE:
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., at viii (1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/176330-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMT7-X6SH] (“A small portion
of officers are disproportionately involved in use-of-force incidents.”).
299. George Wood, Daria Roithmayr & Andrew V. Papachristos, The Network Structure of
Police Misconduct, 5 SOCIUS 1 (2019) (finding through a network analysis of 16,503 complaints
involving 15,811 police officers over a six-year period in Chicago that “almost half of police officers
are connected in misconduct ties in broader networks of misconduct”).
300. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that at least one compelling new paper has cast serious
doubt on whether incapacitating a few bad officers can substantially reduce misconduct. See Aaron
Chalfin & Jacob Kaplan, How Many Complaints Against Police Officers Can Be Abated by
Incapacitating a Few ‘Bad Apples?’ (Oct. 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673981 [https://perma.cc/NEM6-84VL].
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police chiefs complain that arbitrators may still decide that a longdocumented history is insufficient to justify termination.
For instance, a police department documented an extensive
record of prior misconduct by a single officer, including “fourteen (14)
written counseling’s, twenty-two (22) reprimands, and eight (8)
suspensions; the most recent being thirty (30) days.” 301 In August 2007,
that officer detained a man for nine hours after being ordered to release
him from his custody.302 The chief concluded that the officer’s
“irresponsible behavior . . . placed the health and life of the prisoner in
jeopardy.”303 Based on this conclusion and the officer’s extensive
disciplinary history, the mayor terminated his employment.304 But on
appeal, an arbitrator ordered the officer rehired.305 While the arbitrator
agreed that the officer’s behavior “amounted to gross misjudgment and
negligence,” he described termination as “the capital punishment of
employment discipline.”306 Ultimately, he felt such a severe punishment
was inappropriate, largely because he could not find evidence that the
city had similarly punished other officers accused of oversight of
procedures involving inmates in custody.307
This is just one of many similar cases in the dataset. To be clear,
arbitrators likely serve a valuable role in creating incentives for
departments to properly document misconduct by employees over time
and employ a progressive disciplinary system. But to the extent that
the current approach to police disciplinary appeals makes it
unreasonably difficult to remove unfit officers from the force in a timely
manner, the existing system may also impede reform.
C. Alternative Appellate Procedures
Police officers deserve adequate procedural protections against
arbitrary punishment and retaliation. Nevertheless, these protections
should not become so cumbersome as to unreasonably impair the ability
301. City of Florida City v. Dade Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., 2008 BNA LA Supp. (BL)
118889 (Sept. 9, 2008) (Smith, Arb.).
302. Id. The officer was instructed and agreed to release the man before the end of his shift.
But he said that he assumed that the man was released by someone else. The officer also failed to
physically walk into the holding cells or check on the inmate, as was apparently protocol.
303. Id.
304. Id. (explaining how the termination was approved by supervisors and then ordered by
the mayor).
305. Id. (“R shall be reinstated forthwith, to the same or equivalent position that he held prior
to his employment termination.”).
306. Id.
307. Id. (“There was abundant evidence presented by the Union to show that the City was lax
in enforcing the rules requiring arresting officers to check on their prisoners at 30-minute
intervals, and to enter those times in the prisoner log book.”).
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of police supervisors to control their departments or promote reform.
The empirical findings from this Article raise questions about whether
the current approach to police disciplinary appeals in the United States
strikes a fair balance between these competing values. There are
several ways that communities could restructure their police
disciplinary appeals procedures.
First, and perhaps most radically, communities could transfer
disciplinary appeals authority to parties other than arbitrators.
Instead, communities could have more democratically accountable
actors like city managers, mayors, or city councils hear disciplinary
appeals. A number of communities across the country already do this.308
For example, in Murrieta, California, officers have the ability to appeal
discipline issued by the police chief to the city manager.309 This still
provides officers with an opportunity to appeal disciplinary decisions to
a party outside the police department—but one that more intimately
understands the demands of the community and the impact of any
disciplinary decision and termination on the police department. An
examination by the Boston Globe found that Murrieta has not had to
rehire any officer it previously fired while using this appellate model,
something that is not true for many similarly sized departments
utilizing arbitration.310
Of course, police unions may understandably argue that a city
manager is insufficiently detached from the police department to act as
a neutral outsider. In this way, arbitration may have an advantage. If
cities want to maintain the use of arbitration, there are ways to do so
while still providing a more substantial role for community oversight of
the appeals process. A number of cities, including Buena Park,

308. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Fountain Valley and the
Fountain Valley Police Officers’ Association 36–37 (2020), https://www.fountainvalley.org/
DocumentCenter/View/12231/Police-Officers-Association-2020-2021
[https://perma.cc/4HFWC5NZ] (vesting appellate authority in the city manager rather than in arbitrators, and in some
cases allowing challenges of the city manager’s decision to be brought to city council).
309. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Murrieta and the Murrieta
Police Officers Association 5–10 (2019), https://www.murrietaca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/285/
Murrieta-Police-Officers-Association-MPOA-2019-to-2021-PDF
[https://perma.cc/E5MG-3UL2]
(discussing disciplinary and appeals procedures).
310. Editorial Board, Editorial, Other Cities Can Fire Police Officers for Misconduct. Why Not
Boston?, BOS. GLOBE, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/02/opinion/other-cities-can-firepolice-officers-misconduct-why-not-boston/ (last updated July 2, 2020, 4:00 AM)
[https://perma.cc/KES6-UYVH] (“A police department spokesman told the Globe that the city
[Murrieta] has never been forced to rehire a cop who had been previously fired.”).
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California,311 Cathedral City, California,312 Oxnard, California,313 and
Peoria, Arizona,314 use arbitration for disciplinary appeals, but make
the decision of the arbitrator advisory rather than binding. This model
may allow officers to make their case before a neutral outsider, perhaps
in a more procedurally robust manner than anything that may be
available through a department’s internal process. The weight of an
arbitration opinion in an officer’s favor may be sufficient to convince the
city to abide by that decision. But at the same time, this method
recognizes the need for democratic accountability and control over
local police forces by allowing city leaders “to depart from decisions
made by an arbitrator when [they] appear[ ] to run counter to the
public’s interest.”315
Second, if communities want to maintain the use of arbitration
as an important due process protection for officers, they may consider
altering the method of selecting arbitrators to reduce the incentive to
compromise. Minnesota recently enacted such a reform. In the wake of
the killing of George Floyd, legislators in Minnesota passed a wideranging reform bill entitled the Police Accountability Act of 2020.316
While this bill touched on numerous policing issues, 317 it also reformed
the process of selecting arbitrators in police disciplinary appeals.318
Under the new law, the government appoints a roster of six arbitrators
to hear police disciplinary appeals for the state. To be eligible for
311. Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Buena Park, California and the
Buena Park Police Association 40–42, 62–64 (2019), http://www.buenapark.com/home/
showdocument?id=16689 [https://perma.cc/R8FD-5K39] (stating that the arbitrator’s opinion is
advisory in nature).
312. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Cathedral City and Cathedral City
Police Officer’s Association (CCPOA) 21–23 (2020), http://www.joincathedralcity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/CCPOA-MOU-Final-05.07.20-1-Rev.-06.10.20-Side-Letter-10.01.20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y9R7-SMTQ] (“City Manager or designee mutually agreeable to the City
Manager and the employee shall review the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, but shall not be
bound thereby.”).
313. See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oxnard and Oxnard Peace Officers’
Association 22–23 (2016), https://www.oxnard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/OPOA-MOU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TAU-78HA] (also making arbitration decisions advisory).
314. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Peoria and Peoria Police Officers
Association, Covering Police Officers Unit 23–24 (2018), https://www.peoriaaz.gov/home/
showpublisheddocument?id=17212 [https://perma.cc/6PGA-2AL8] (allowing police department to
appeal arbitration decision to city manager).
315. Rushin, supra note 25, at 591.
316. See Orenstein & Callaghan, supra note 67 (discussing the law).
317. League Calls on Legislature to Keep Working on Police Arbitration Reform, LEAGUE OF
MINN. CITIES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.lmc.org/news-publications/news/all/police-arbitrationreform [https://perma.cc/EZ4N-7MTH] (noting that the new police reform bill in Minnesota was
wide-ranging, including limitations on the use of chokeholds, the establishment of an independent
use of force investigation unit at the state level, and reporting requirements for officer use of force).
318. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.892 (West 2020) (providing a description of this
selection method).
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selection on the state’s appointed roster, a potential arbitrator must
“complete training . . . [on] cultural competency, racism, implicit bias,
and recognizing and valuing community diversity and cultural
differences.”319 Now, anytime a police disciplinary appeal proceeds to
arbitration, there is no longer an alternate strike system to select an
arbitrator. Instead, the state simply assigns one of these six arbitrators
on a rotating basis.320 The hope is that by eliminating the traditional
selection process, arbitrators will not have the same incentives to
compromise in order to increase their probability of being selected in
future cases.321 Time will tell whether this change in selection method
will influence arbitration outcomes. But at a minimum, the Minnesota
reform removes the appearance of either management or unions
attempting to game the arbitrator selection process to their advantage.
Third, as an alternative to altering the selection process,
communities that want to maintain the use of arbitration could limit
the standard of review on appeal or the remedies available to an
arbitrator. Currently, most arbitrators are given fairly expansive
authority to rehear most or all factual and legal disputes in disciplinary
cases on appeal, something that rarely occurs in other appellate
contexts.322 But it does not have to be this way. Some communities
already give arbitrators narrower standards of review. 323 Rather than
granting arbitrators the ability to determine whether “just cause”
existed for the discipline, communities could instead limit the
arbitrators’ review authority to a determination of whether the
punishment was, say, arbitrary or capricious. Or they could limit the
ability of arbitrators to amend the disciplinary punishment, provided
that the employer has satisfied the preponderance of the evidence
standard in proving a violation of departmental policy.
Consider the example of Oregon.324 Under the recently passed
law in that state, police departments must now negotiate with police
319. Id. § 628.892(10)(a)(1).
320. Id. § 628.892(11) (“The commissioner shall assign or appoint an arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators from the roster to a peace officer grievance arbitration under this section on rotation
through the roster alphabetically ordered by last name.”).
321. Collins, supra note 136.
322. Rushin, supra note 25, at 576–78.
323. See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Bloomington, Illinois and Police Benevolent and
Protective Association, Unit No. 21, at 15 (2014), https://www.cityblm.org/Home/
ShowDocument?id=504 [https://perma.cc/R84T-G83V] (establishing a standard of review that says
arbitrator must uphold punishment unless “arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the needs of
the service”).
324. For a brief history of the debate surrounding this law, see Nigel Jaquiss, Skeptics Say
Oregon’s Police Arbitration Bill Doesn’t Do Enough, While Cops Play Defense, WILLAMETTE
WEEK (June 25, 2020), https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/06/25/skeptics-say-oregons-policearbitration-bill-doesnt-do-enough-while-cops-play-defense [https://perma.cc/8TJA-3S89]; see also
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unions over the terms of a disciplinary matrix that will set levels of
discipline for different types of officer misconduct.325 Once the two
parties have reached an agreement on the terms of their agreed upon
disciplinary matrix, state law limits the ability of arbitrators to deviate
from a police chief’s disciplinary decision on appeal, as long as it abides
by the disciplinary matrix.326 Essentially, if an arbitrator agrees that
evidence existed to justify the punishment in question and the
punishment is within the limits of the disciplinary matrix, the
arbitrator may not reduce the officer’s discipline below that issued by
the city management or police chief. The Oregon approach effectively
narrows the arbitrator’s standard of review and remedial toolkit—
potentially meeting some of the demands of reform activists and
management. At the same time, it also puts the impetus on cities to
proactively negotiate the terms of the disciplinary matrix in a manner
that satisfies union demands for predictability in punishment and fair
notice. Like with the Minnesota reform, time will tell whether the
Oregon approach will influence disciplinary appeal outcomes. But the
Oregon law may prove to be the most politically palatable reform option
for some states in the future, as it has the potential to garner limited
support from police reformers, management, and unions.
CONCLUSION
This Article finds that police arbitration results in nearly half of
all police disciplinary penalties being reduced or overturned on appeal,
often because of arbitrators’ reevaluation of the factual support for
disciplinary charges or because of their belief that the proposed
punishment is excessive. This finding raises broader normative
questions about how communities ought to structure the police
disciplinary appeals process. Police disciplinary appeals are
challenging, in part because the stakes in many of these cases are
extraordinarily high. On the one hand, unjust discipline can unfairly
derail an officer’s livelihood. On the other hand, failure to respond

Dirk VanderHart & Jeff Mapes, Oregon Legislature Advances Police Accountability Measures, OR.
PUB. BROAD. (June 26, 2020), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-senate-sends-policediscipline-bill-to-house [https://perma.cc/THK9-BE7C] (describing the advancement of the bill and
its development over time).
325. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(7)(g) (West 2020) (detailing the matrices requirement for
collective bargaining purposes).
326. Id. § 243.706(3) (explaining that if an “arbitrator makes a finding that misconduct has
occurred consistent with the law enforcement agency’s finding of misconduct,” then “the
arbitration award may not order any disciplinary action that differs from . . . the provisions of a
discipline guide or discipline matrix adopted by the agency”).
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forcefully to evidence of misconduct can put members of the public at
risk for the deadly consequences of police wrongdoing.
Take the example of an officer from the Oakland Police
Department.327 On New Year’s Eve of 2007, that officer shot and killed
an unarmed twenty-year-old man who ran and hid from the officer.328
Only seven months later, that officer shot another unarmed twentyyear-old three times in the back, killing him.329 The officer’s actions cost
the city $650,000 in a civil judgment.330 Based on these events, the City
of Oakland terminated his employment.331 But as in many of the cases
discussed in this Article, an arbitrator overturned this decision and
ordered the officer rehired with full back pay.332 The arbitrator
disagreed with the city’s conclusion that the officer’s use of force was
unjustified and argued that “sacrificing [the officer] on the altar of
public opinion” would not bring back the victim.333
All officers, including that officer in Oakland, deserve adequate
due process before they suffer serious discipline. And no officer’s career
should be unfairly ended for political expedience. Even so, the Oakland
Police Department also has a pressing need to rigorously enforce its
bars on officer use of excessive force. The current approach to police
disciplinary appeals in the United States may not be striking an
appropriate balance between these important, competing values. By
narrowing the standard of review on appeal, limiting the available
remedies, or modifying the process of selecting arbitrators,
communities may be able to better strike a balance between officer due
process rights and the need for rigorous accountability.

327. Sean Maher, Oakland Police Officer to be Reinstated, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2011,
11:11 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2011/03/06/oakland-police-officer-to-be-reinstated
[https://perma.cc/69WS-ZH7D].
328. Id. (“[H]e and another officer shot and killed 20-year-old Andrew Moppin after a traffic
stop, when Moppin ran and hid and then shouted and swore at officers, police officials said.”).
329. Id.
330. Friedersdorf, supra note 32.
331. Maher, supra note 327 (noting that he was fired specifically for the 2008 shooting, not for
the 2007 shooting that was deemed consistent with policy).
332. Eat, Shrink, & Be Merry, Police Officer’s Reinstatement Sends Wrong Message, E.
BAY TIMES, https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2011/03/10/police-officers-reinstatement-sends-wrongmessage (last updated Aug. 15, 2016, 3:12 PM) [https://perma.cc/KH95-QFLZ] (noting that he was
awarded around $200,000 in backpay).
333. Henry K. Lee, Oakland Must Rehire Cop Who Shot Suspect in Back, SFGATE (Mar. 5,
2011), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-must-rehire-cop-who-shot-suspect-in-back2528215.php [https://perma.cc/JJ6Z-7FP5].

